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Antitrust and First Amendment Implications
of Professional Real Estate Investors
Gary Myers*
L Introduction
The First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances' has received relatively little attention compared to other portions
of the Bill of Rights. In 1993, the Supreme Court decided an antitrust case2
that dramatically changed the law of antitrust immunity for litigation, which
is one form of petitioning activity This decision has important ramifica-
tions not only for antitrust law, but also for all laws that regulate litigation
behavior, such as the tort of abuse of process and Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
An extensive amount of litigation and commentary regarding the
circumstances in which lawsuits can be used as an anticompetitive weapon
has developed over the last thirty years.' As a general rule, lawsuits and
other efforts to petition the government are immune from antitrust scrutiny,
a principle established in two Supreme Court cases, Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.4 and United Mine
Workers v Pennington.5 This principle-known as the Noerr-Pennington
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. B.A., New York
University; M.A. (Econ.), i.D., Duke University. Member, State Bar of Georgia. I
sincerely appreciate comments from George Cochran and Greg Mark on a previous draft
and the research assistance of Stacey Goff and Libbie Kakales. Research for this Article
was supported by a grant from the Lamar Order of the University of Mississippi.
1. The Petition Clause of the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
law abridging the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. For discussion of this right, see infra notes 215-
319 and accompanying text.
2. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 1920 (1993).
3. See nfra notes 15-82 and accompanying text.
4. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
5. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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doctrine-states that genuine efforts to lobby the government are immune
from liability under the antitrust laws, even if the petitioning efforts lead to
plainly anticompetitive government actions.6
This immunity extends to litigation behavior, a point firmly established
in California Motor Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited.7 An antitrust
plaintiff can overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity only by satisfying the
requirements of the "sham" exception: "[IT]here may be instances where the
alleged conspiracy 'is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor."'" In such instances, "the application of the Sherman Act
would be justified."9 Significantly, California Motor Transport also
expressly held that Noerr-Pennngton immunity is based both on an
interpretation of the Sherman Act and on the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment. to
The issue of whether allegedly predatory litigation behavior falls under
the sham exception has been heavily litigated. Finding the lower courts
hopelessly divided, the Supreme Court recently decided a sham litigation
case, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc." This decision announced a new two-part test for the sham
exception and provided some guidance in its application. The Court
declined to impose potential antitrust liability based solely on a showing that
litigation was used for predatory purposes. 2 Instead, an antitrust plaintiff
must first prove that the litigation was "objectively baseless in the sense that
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.""
After establishing this fact, the plaintiff must then prove that the litigation
was brought for anticompetitive purposes.14
6. See United Mine Workers v Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965); Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
7 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
8. California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972)
(quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).
9. Id. (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).
10. See id. at 510.
11. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
12. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 1920, 1927 (1993).
13. Id. at 1928.
14. Id.
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The Court's decision raises new issues in antitrust law and leaves some
important questions unresolved. Furthermore, although the opinion only
addressed antitrust immunity for litigation activity, the First Amendment
concerns expressed in Professional Real Estate Investors arguably constrain
other areas of federal and state law, such as Rule 11 and the tort of abuse
of process. These topics are the subject of this Article.
This Article begins with a discussion of the development of Noerr-
Pennington immunity as it applies to litigation behavior. Parts III and IV
describe the litigation n Professional Real Estate Investors and then analyze
the effect of tls new decision on predatory litigation law Part V discusses
possible ramifications of the case for other areas of federal and state law in
which subjective intent is the sole keystone for the imposition of liability on
petitioning activity Because Professional Real Estate Investors interprets
the First Amendment to preclude antitrust liability in these cases, other laws
that deter bad faith litigation may no longer be valid in light of the Court's
expanded view of the protected role of litigation under the Petition Clause.
II. Basic Principles of Noerr-Pennlngton Immunity
A. Antitrust Remedies for Predatory Litigation
It is well established that litigation and other forms of petitioning
activity can be part of a firm's anticompetitive strategy Predatory
litigation can serve several possible anticompetitive functions, including
eliminating or disciplining competitors, raising rivals' costs, and delaying
or deterring entry into a market.15 From an economic standpoint, when a
15. For a discussion of the purposes of predatory litigation, see James D. Hurwitz,
Abuse of Government Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74
GEO. L.J. 65, 68-75 (1985); Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J.
565, 586-96 (1992). See also Michael W Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust Violation:
Conflict Between the First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F L. REv 41, 43 n.5
(1981) (discussing use of litigation to raise rivals' costs, particularly financing expenses);
Christopher C. Klem, Predation in the Courts: Legal Versus Economic Analysis in Sham
Litigation Cases, 10 INT'L REV L. & ECON. 29, 29 & n.3 (1990) (noting argument that
predatory litigation rarely takes place). See generally DOUGLAS F GREER, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 343-44 (1980) (discussing disciplining competitors and
giving examples from various industries); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209 (1986) (discussing cost-raising strategies); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman,
Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv 267 (1983) (same).
Former Judge Robert H. Bork described predatory litigation as a serious threat to free
competition:
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litigant brings suit for one of these reasons (rather than in an effort to
prevail in the courtroom), the suit is predatory and threatens competition
on the merits. Although the Supreme Court has ruled that legitimate
petitioning activity is beyond the scope of the Sherman Act, this immunity
does not apply if an antitrust plaintiff can prove that the petitioning activity
was a "shamnn. " "
Even if the plaintiff is able to establish that the litigation constituted a
sham, the defendant is not necessarily liable for an antitrust violation. 17
The antitrust plaintiff must still meet the affirmative elements of the claim."8
Section 2 of the Sherman Act19 requires a two-part showing to establish the
offense of monopolization: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. "I If the defendant
There is, of course, no way of estimating precisely how much competition
is crippled or stifled each year through the abuse of governmental processes.
However, the number of cases beginning to arise m the relatively new field of
litigation (as well as some practical experience with local businessmen) leads one
to believe that this form of predation may be common and that the aggregate
annual loss to consumers may be very large. The antitrust laws can make a
major contribution both to free competition and to the integrity of administrative
and judicial processes by catching up with this means of monopolization.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 348-49
(1978).
16. See California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-12
(1972); see also supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
17 Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 1920, 1928 (1993). Lower courts made this point clear prior to the decision m
Professional Real Estate Investors. See, e.g., CVD, Inc. v Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842,
851 (ist Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Clipper Exxpress v Rocky
Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1247 n.7, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that if antitrust plaintiff establishes that Noerr immunity does not apply, it must
then establish elements of Sherman Act violation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
18. Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony " Id.
20. United States v Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). In Aspen Skiing
Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), the Supreme Court adopted
the following definition of predation:
The question whether [a defendant's] conduct may properly be characterized
1202
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has not attained a monopoly position, it may still be liable for attempted
monopolization if the plaintiff can prove (1) a specific intent to control
prices or to destroy competition, (2) anticompetitive or predatory conduct
designed to achieve this goal, (3) a dangerous probability of success, and
(4) antitrust injury causally linked to the violation.2 If the litigation
involves concerted behavior by two or more competitors, it may also violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Finally, predatory litigation may be an
unfair trade practice in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'
B. Early Decisions Establishing Petitioning Immunity
The landmark Supreme Court decision establishing immunity for
efforts to petition the government is Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference
v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.24 The plaintiffs, a group of truck operators
and their trade association, filed an antitrust claim against twenty-four
as exclusionary cannot be answered by simply considering its effect on [the
plaintiff]. In addition, it is relevant to consider its impact on consumers and
whether it has impaired competition m an unnecessarily restrictive way If a
firm has been "attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,"
it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory
Id. at 605 (footnotes omitted) (quoting BORK, supra note 15, at 138). As m the case of
attempted monopolization, the plaintiff must also prove that the violation caused antitrust
injury
21. Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc., 783 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); see also Handgards, Inc. v Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d
1282, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, m restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
For examples of predatory litigation cases under § 1 of the Sherman Act, see United Mine
Workers v Pennigton, 381 U.S. 657, 659-69 (1965) (claims under §§ 1 and 2); Federal
Prescription Serv., Inc. v American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (claim under § 1), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Feminist Women's Health Ctr.
v Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1978) (claims under §§ 1 and 2), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). The Federal Trade Commission has brought few
sham litigation cases. See L.G. Balfour Co. v FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 14-16 (7th Cir. 1971);
New Eng. Motor Rate Bureau, Inc., No. 9170, 1989 FTC LEXIS 62, at *44-49 (Aug. 18,
1989) (involving filing of tariffs with regulatory agencies).
24. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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railroads, a railroad trade association, and a public relations firm.' The
truckers claimed that the railroad interests had conspired to restrain trade
and to monopolize the long-distance freight business in violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.26 The truckers alleged that the
defendants employed a lobbying and publicity campaign to discredit the
trucking industry and to encourage the passage of laws harmful to them.'
According to the truckers' complaint, the sole purpose of this campaign
was to destroy the trucking industry as competitors in the long-distance
freight business.' The plaintiffs also claimed that the lobbying was
deceptive because the railroads used the "thrd-party technique" by
sponsoring publicity that falsely appeared to originate from independent
third parties.29 The district court found that the railroads had violated the
Sherman Act because of the improper motivation of their lobbying efforts
and the deceptive nature of the thrd-party techmque.3 0 A divided court
of appeals affirmed.3'
Holding that the defendants had not violated the Sherman Act, the
Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court based its holding on
two principal grounds. First, Justice Black noted that the Sherman
Act-given its language and purpose-does not apply to valid exercises
of governmental power.32 Thus, otherwise unlawful actions mandated by
the federal government33 and by the states do not violate the Sherman





29. Id. at 129-30; see Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust:
A Modem Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 907, 914-18
(1990) (discussing deceptive lobbying techniques employed by railroads).
30. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 132-33.
31. Id. at 135.
32. See rd. at 135-36.
33. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1939) (stating
that Secretary of Agriculture's order, issued pursuant to federal statute, does not violate
Sherman Act even if order fixes prices and results m monopoly).
34. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943) (holding that state's
agricultural prorate program, as valid exercise of state's legislative authority, does not
violate Sherman Act). The scope of Parker immunity has been the subject of a number of
subsequent cases. See generally City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499
U.S. 365 (1991); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Southern
1204
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Act. 5 Because the Sherman Act does not reach these (often anticompeti-
tive) governmental actions, it should not reach a private party's legitimate
efforts to urge the government to take such an action. 6 The Sherman Act
regulates business activity in the marketplace in order to prevent firms
from acting anticompetitively; it does not reach lobbying or other political
activities.'
The Court's second rationale for its holding was a constitutional one:
The Sherman Act would create serious constitutional problems if the Court
interpreted it to reach the railroads' lobbying efforts."8 The First Amend-
ment's Petition Clause protects lobbying and other petitioning activities,
and the Court refused to interpret the Sherman Act in a manner that would
infringe upon that right.39 This constitutional grounding for the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine indicates that the recent Professional Real Estate
Investors decision may have important implications beyond the realm of
antitrust law I
In light of this statutory and constitutional framework, the Court
found that the defendants had not violated the Sherman Act.41 Justice
Black first addressed the assertion that the defendants' sole purpose in
conducting their lobbying efforts was to destroy the trucking industry as
a competitor in long-distance freight hauling.42 His unqualified rejection
of this argument foreshadowed the result in Professional Real Estate
Investors:
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Hoover v
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978). For analysis of the Court's latest discussion of the interaction between Noerr and
Parker, see infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
35. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
36. See id.
37 See id.
38. Id. at 137-38.
39. See id. at 138. The Court in California Motor Transport Co. v Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), expressly stated that Noerr rests on both Sherman Act and
First Amendment grounds. Id. at 509-10. Nonetheless, commentators have debated as to
whether Noerr is based solely on an interpretation of the Sherman Act m light of First
Amendment considerations or whether Justice Black actually reached the constitutional issue.
See infra note 261.
40. See infra notes 215-319 and accompanying text.
41. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
42. See id. at 138-40.
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The right of the people to inform their representatives m government of
their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot
properly be made to depend on their intent in doing so. It is neither
unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that
they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to
their competitors. Indeed, it is quite probably people with just such
a hope of personal advantage who provide much of the information upon
which governments must act. A construction of the Sherman Act that
would disqualify people from taking a public position on matters in
which they are financially interested would thus deprive the government
of a valuable source of information and, at the same time, deprive the
people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that right
may be of the most importance to them.43
Even if the defendants' lobbying efforts were motivated solely by
anticompetitive purposes,' their actions were immune from liability under
the Sherman Act.4 The degree to which this holding extends to other types
of petitioning activity, such as litigation, was one frequently litigated issue
resolved by Professional Real Estate Investors.6
The next decision focusing on petitioning immunity was United Mine
Workers v Pennington,47 in which the United Mine Workers (UMW)
retirement fund sued Phillips Brothers Coal Company (Phillips) to collect
payments owed to the fund under a wage agreement. 48 Phillips counter-
claimed and argued that the UMW and various large coal companies had
conspired to restrain and monopolize commerce in violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.49 The UMW's wage agreement allegedly had
the effect of squeezing out small coal producers, such as Phillips.' The
43. Id. at 139.
44. The Court assumed that the district court's finding of anticompetitive purpose was
correct, although it viewed the evidence on this point as weak. See id. at 138 n.18.
Noerr also rejected the argument that the defendants' use of the third-party technique
rendered their actions unlawful. See id. at 140-42. Although the tactic was unethical and
deceptive, the Sherman Act establishes a code of ethics "that condemns trade restraints, not
political activity." Id. at 140. Justice Black therefore concluded that the use of the third-
party technique as part of the defendants' lobbying efforts did not violate the Sherman Act.
Id. at 142.
45. See td. at 139-40.
46. See infra notes 83-214 and accompanying text.
47 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
48. United Mine Workers v Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659 (1965).
49 Id.
50. See rd. at 660.
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large coal companies and the UMW, acting jointly, successfully persuaded
the Secretary of Labor to adopt a high minimum wage for employees of
companies that sold coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)." They
also approached TVA officials and attempted to persuade them to change
the TVA's coal purchasing policies in a manner detrimental to small coal
operators. 52 The jury rendered a verdict against the UMW, and the court
of appeals upheld the verdict.53
After determining that the labor exemption did not apply to the
agreements between the UMW and the large coal operators,' the Supreme
Court addressed the Noerr-Pennngton issue. 5' Justice White held that the
defendants' attempt to influence the actions of executive branch and agency
officials was immune under Noerr 6  Reaffirming the principle that
anticompetitive purpose does not vitiate the immunity, Justice White stated:
"Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws
even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal,
either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act." 7 Thus, in Pennington, the Court once again rejected an
immunity standard under which subjective intent serves as the linchpin for
liability
C. Immunity for Litigation Behavior
In California Motor Transport Co. v Truckng Unlimited,"8 the
Supreme Court first addressed the specific application of petitioning
nnmunity to litigation activities. The case involved a dispute between two
competing groups of trucking firms.' 9 The complaint alleged that the
51. Id.
52. See id. at 660-61.
53. Id. at 661.
54. See id. at 661-69. Three Justices dissented from the opinion but concurred in the
result; Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart believed that the labor exemption for
collective bargaining activity protected the UMW's actions from antitrust scrutiny See
generally id. at 697-735 (opinion of Goldberg, J.).
55. See id. at 669-72.
56. See id. at 670.
57 Id. Evidence of efforts to influence public officials could be introduced to show
the purpose and character of the defendants' actions. See id. at 670 n.3.
58. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
59. See California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509
(1972).
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defendant truckers had conspired to monopolize and restrain trade by
preventing and delaying the plaintiffs' efforts to obtain motor earner
operating rights.' The weapon used to accomplish this objective was the
filing of numerous lawsuits in state and federal court, including applica-
tions for review of agency decisions, appeals, and petitions for court
rehearings.6" In response, the defendants sought dismissal of the suit on
the basis of Noerr-Pennngton immunity 62
Significantly for purposes of analyzing the broader implications of the
Noerr-Pennngton doctrine, the California Motor Transport Court's
analysis began with the express statement that immuity for petitiomng
executive and legislative officials is based on two grounds: (1) a legislative
interpretation of the Sherman Act, which regulates business activity and
not political activity, and (2) a constitutional limit on the antitrust laws
based on the First Amendment right to petition (and right of association).63
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas then extended the First
Amendment-based Noerr-Pennington ummunity to litigation:
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association
and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not,
without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures
of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and
points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic
interests vis-a-vis their competitors. 64
Although litigation is generally immune from antitrust scrutiny,
California Motor Transport reiterated "that there may be instances where
the alleged conspiracy 'is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justi-
fied."' Justice Douglas proceeded to offer what appeared to be different
guidelines for litigation immuity, which he distinguished from immunity
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See d. at 511.
63. Id. at 510.
64. Id. at 510-11.
65. Id. at 511 (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
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for lobbying legislators and members of the executive branch." Signifi-
cantly, he focused on the subjective purposes of the defendants' litigation
strategy; the complaint in California Motor Transport alleged that these
purposes were to drive out competitors, to create barriers to entry, and to
establish a monopoly 67 Despite the holdings in Noerr and
Pemngton-that a defendant's anticompetitive purpose or intent would not
vitiate the immunity for lobbying efforts-the Court indicated that such
predatory litigation strategies were not immune from the Sherman Act.6"
Instead of establishing a general standard or test (subjective,
objective, or both), the Court only provided factual illustrations of cases
m which the sham exception to Noerr-Pennngton would apply 69 On the
facts of the instant case, the complaint sufficiently alleged a sham because
it alleged predatory intent combined with "access barring."7" Rather than
attempting to influence public officials, the defendant truckers allegedly
"sought to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory
tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process. It is alleged that
they 'instituted the proceedings and actions with or without probable
cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases.'"71 This unethical
conduct, which might be tolerated in the lobbying arena, would not be
protected in the courtroom.
Cahifornta Motor Transport then discussed examples of other types of
conduct that would constitute a sham under Noerr-Pennngton:72 perjury
of witnesses, use of a fraudulently obtained patent to exclude competitors,
66. See id. at 511-12.
67 See id. at 511.
68. See id. at 511-12.
69. See id. at 512-13.
70. See id. at 511-12.
71. Id. at 512. The Court elaborated as follows:
One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but
a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder
to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused.
That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the case
is established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz.,
effectively barring [competitors] from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar
as the administrative or judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind
cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of "political
expression."
Id. at 513.
72. See id. at 512-13.
1209
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conspiracy with government officials, 73 and bribery '" In addition to these
illustrations, the Court observed that "[t]here are many other forms of
illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or
judicial processes and which, may result in antitrust violations. Misrepre-
sentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immumnzed when used
in the adjudicatory process."' Thus, the Court implied that litigation
behavior is evaluated under a more demanding standard than lobbying
behavior. Discussion of the sham exception mn California Motor Transport
engendered litigation regarding the role of intent, the number and type of
suits required to find a sham, and the overall standard for litigation
behavior.76
73. The Supreme Court eliminated the "conspiracy" exception in City of Columbia v
Omm Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374-79 (1991). C. Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-08 (1962) (stating that conspiracy
with government official to eliminate competitor may result in antitrust transgression);
Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964) (stating that Sherman Act
violation may be found when defendants allegedly induced attorney general to place financial
institution m receivership).
74. See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851, 862 (9th
Cir. 1965) (concluding that bribery of public official may violate § 2(c) of Clayton Act, as
amended by Robmson-Patman Act). A landmark patent fraud case is Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). In Walker
Process, a firm allegedly obtained a patent through fraudulent representations to the Patent
Office and then sought to use the patent to eliminate a new competitor. See id. at 173-74.
The Court found that the firm's patent fraud was actionable under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
See id. at 176-77
75. Californma Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513. One commentator has argued that
lobbying efforts directed toward the legislative and executive branches are potentially more
harmful than sham litigation. See Minda, supra note 29, at 930-31.
76. Shortly after California Motor Transport, the Court heard another petitioning
immunity case. Otter Tail Power Co. v United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), involved
possible immunity for the filing of lawsuits by an electric power company in an alleged
attempt to prevent or delay entry of new competitors. See id. at 368. Because the district
court had refused to apply Noerr-Pennington immunity to litigation behavior (as opposed to
lobbying efforts), the Court did not reach the immunity issue and, instead, remanded the
issue for further consideration in light of California Motor Transport. Id. at 379-80. On
remand, the district court found that the defendant's actions fell within the sham exception
to Noerr-Pennington:
Upon consideration of the arguments and briefs, and upon a reconsideration
of the pertinent portions of the record, I find that the repetitive use of litigation
by Otter Tail was timed and designed principally to prevent the establishment
of municipal electric systems and thereby to preserve defendant's monopoly
I find the litigation comes within the sham exception to the Noerr doctrine as
1210
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D Recent Decisions and an Overview
In City of Columbia v Omm Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ,' an outdoor
billboard firm (Omni) sued a competitor (Columbia Outdoor Advertising)
and the city of Columbia, South Carolina. Omi claimed that the city
council enacted a restrictive billboard ordinance that was designed to
benefit Columbia Outdoor Advertising, which dominated the local market,
and to limit Omni's ability to compete.7" A major issue in the case was
whether there was a "conspiracy" exception to Noerr-Pennington and to
its logical counterpart, state action immunity under Parker v Brown.79
Noting that there is no conspiracy exception to either the state action or
the petitioning immunities, Justice Scalia observed in the majority opinion
that a conspiracy exception would be impractical: "Since it is both
inevitable and desirable that public officials often agree to do what one or
another group of private citizens urges upon them, such an exception
would virtually swallow up the Parker rule: All anticompetitive regulation
would be vulnerable to a 'conspiracy' charge."80 Because "Parker and
Noerr generally present two faces of the same coin," Justice Scalia
concluded that the same considerations mandated rejection of a conspiracy
exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity 1
defined by the Supreme Court in California Transport
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F Supp. 451, 451-52 (D. Minn. 1973), aft'd,
417 U.S. 901 (1974).
77 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
78. City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 368-69
(1991).
79. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
80. Omm Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. at 375. A number of circuits had previously
acknowledged the existence of a conspiracy exception. See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp.
v City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1566-68 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (acknowledging
conspiracy exception to state action doctrine), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986);
Westborough Mall, Inc. v City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th Cir. 1982)
(same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Federal Prescription Serv. v American
Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 264-65 & n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 928 (1982); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 379-81 (5th Cir. 1977) (same),
vacated sub nom. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated, 576 F.2d 696 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979).
81. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. at 383. Justice Scalia's analysis is worth
quotation, in part because it focuses on antitrust policy and not on constitutional
considerations:
As we have described, Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of the
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Most importantly for purposes of this Article, Omm Outdoor Advertis-
ing discussed the sham exception:
The "sham" exception to Noerr encompasses situations m which
persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that
process-as an anticompetitive weapon. A classic example is the filing
of frivolous objections to the license applications of a competitor, with
no expectation of achieving demal of the license but simply in order to
impose expense and delay A "sham" situation involves a defendant
whose activities are "not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable
government action" at all, not one "who 'genuinely seeks to achieve is
governmental result, but does so through improper means.'"'
In light of Noerr-Pennington and its progeny, several principles are
clear. Based on both antitrust and First Amendment considerations,
legitimate attempts to petition the government, including litigation before
courts and administrative bodies, are immune from the Sherman Act.
Nonetheless, recogmzing that not every petitiomng effort is legitimate and
worthy of First Amendment protection, the Court has fashioned a "sham"
exception. The precise contours of the sham exception have been unclear,
but the Court's most recent Noerr-Pennington case provided a new
governing standard. Because of the constitutional underpinnings of the
case, Professional Real Estate Investors has significant consequences both
principle that the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics The Noerr-
invalidating conspiracy alleged here is just the Parker-invalidating conspiracy
viewed from the standpoint of the private-sector participants rather than the
governmental participants. The same factors which make it impracticable
or beyond the purpose of the antitrust laws to identify and invalidate lawmaking
that has been infected by selfishly motivated agreement with private interests
likewise make it impracticable or beyond that scope to identify and invalidate
lobbying that has produced selfishly motivated agreement with public offi-
cials. And if the invalidating "conspiracy" is limited to one that involves
some element of unlawfulness (beyond mere anticompetitive motivation), the
invalidation would have nothing to do with the policies of the antitrust laws. In
Noerr itself, where the private party "deliberately deceived the public and public
officials" m its successful lobbying campaign, we said that "deception,
reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is
concerned."
Id. at 383-84 (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 145 (1961)).
82. Id. at 380 (citations omitted) (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4, 508 n.10 (1988) (quoting Session Tank Liners, Inc. v
Joor Mfg., Inc., 827 F.2d 458, 465 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated, 487 U.S. 1213 (1988))).
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for antitrust law m particular and for the regulation of lawyers and litigation
practices in general.
III. Overview of the Litigation in Professional Real Estate Investors
A. Factual Setting
The litigation in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc.s began in 1983. Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. (PRE) operated a resort hotel in Palm Springs, California
called La Mancha Private Club and Villas." PRE placed videodisc players
m each room and assembled a collection of 200 videodiscs, which it made
available for rental to guests.85 PRE also attempted to market videodisc
players to other hotels for in-room viewing. 6
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. and seven other major movie
studios' (collectively, Columbia) owned the copyrights to the movies that
PRE was renting to its guests.' Columbia also licensed Spectradyne, a
cable system for rn-room movie viewing. 9 Thus, PRE and Columbia were
competitors in the market for in-room movie viewing.9
Columbia sued PRE in 1983 and claimed that the resort violated its
movie copyrights by renting videodiscs for in-room viewing.9 PRE filed
a counterclaim, which alleged that Columbia's lawsuit was a sham under
Noerr-Pennington and asserted unfair competition and violations of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 In order to evaluate PRE's antitrust counter-
claim, it is important to begin with an assessment of Columbia's copyright
suit.
83. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
84. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 1920, 1923 (1993).
85. Id. Videodisc players are similar to video cassette recorders (VCRs), except that
videodisc players use large discs and offer higher quality sound and pictures than do VCRs.
86. Id.
87 The other studios were Embassy Pictures, Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Productions, Warner
Brothers, Inc., and CBS, Inc. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 743, 744 (C.D. Cal. 1986), 'd, 866 F.2d 278 (9th
Cir. 1989).




92. See id. at 1924.
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Under federal copyright law, a copyright owner has various exclusive
rights, one of which is the right to control the public performance of its
works.' Under the "first sale" doctrine, however, PRE could freely sell,
lease, rent, or otherwise dispose of its copies of Columbia's movies. 4 This
provision would, for example, permit a movie rental store to rent movies
for private viewing at customers' homes, but would not permit anyone to
"perform the copyrighted work publicly "I Thus, if the movie rental store
leased a theater, it could not open the theater to the public and permit
customers to view a movie owned by Columbia; such an action would
constitute a public performance, which would require Columbia's
authorization. Therefore, the success of Columbia's copyright claim hinged
on whether PRE's rental of videodiscs for rn-room viewing constituted a
public performance, rather than a private viewing by resort guests.
The district court, granting PRE's motion for summary judgment on
the copyright claim, agreed that the viewing of movies in guest rooms is
not a public performance of the movie.96 Columbia appealed this ruling to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which addressed
the narrow issue of whether the m-room viewing of movies was a public
performance.' Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a public
performance as either (1) a performance of a work "at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered" or (2) a
transmission of the copyrighted work to the public (such as by a cable
wire).9" Col umbia argued that PRE's actions constituted a public perfor-
mance under either of these clauses."
Columbia's argument as to the first prong of the public performance
definition was plausible. The issue was unsettled, and Columbia arguably
had some precedential support. Columbia largely relied on Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc. v Redd Home, Inc., a case in which it
93. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988).
94. See id. § 109(a).
95. Id. § 106(4).
96. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 743, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
97 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866
F.2d 278, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1989).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
99. Professional Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d at 280.
100. 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
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successfully asserted a copyright claim against a movie rental store. In
Redd Home, a movie rental store had private viewing rooms on its
premises; customers could rent a movie and watch it in these viewing
rooms.10' The court held that these performances were public because
anyone could come into the store, rent a movie, and watch it in one of the
rooms. 1 2 Columbia argued in Professional Real Estate Investors that the
resort hotel rooms were analogous to the screening rooms in Redd Home. 3
Distinguishing Redd Home on its facts, the Ninth Circuit rejected
Columbia's argument."° It noted that PRE's operation was different in
nature than the one in Redd Home: PRE provides "living accommodations
and general hotel services, which may incidentally include the rental of
videodiscs to interested guests for viewing in guest rooms. While the hotel
may indeed be 'open to the public,' a guest's hotel room, once rented, is
not." '0 5 The court concluded that the hotel room was equivalent to a
customer's private home, rather than the screening room at issue in Redd
Home: "La Mancha guests do not view the videodiscs in hotel meeting
rooms used for large gatherings. The movies are viewed exclusively in
guest rooms, places where individuals enjoy a substantial degree of privacy,
not unlike their own homes."'16
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Columbia's second (and much weaker)
argument, which was based on the second definition of a public perfor-
mance under section 101 ("transmit or otherwise commumcate"). 0 7 The
court concluded that the videodisc rentals did not satisfy this language
because the rentals did not involve broadcasting or cable transmission of the
movies to the public (as is done in Spectradyne's wired cable system).'°
B. PRE's Antitrust Claim
The Professional Real Estate Investors litigation then returned to the
California district court, which focused on PRE's antitrust counterclaim."'9
101. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 156-57 (3d
Cir. 1984).
102. See id. at 159.
103. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d at 280.
104. See id. at 281.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107 See 17 U.S.C. § 101, ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, 866 F.2d at 281-82.
108. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d at 281-82.
109. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.,
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Columbia sought and obtained summary judgment on the basis of Noerr-
Pennington immunity "' The district court found that Columbia's suit did
not fall within the sham exception:
It was clear from the manner in which the case was presented that
[Columbia] was seeking and expecting a favorable judgment. Although
I decided against [Columbia], the case was far from easy to resolve, and
it was evident from the opinion affirming my order that the Court of
Appeals had trouble with it as well. I find that there was probable cause
for bringing the action, regardless of whether the issue was considered
a question of fact or of law "
The district court refused to permit PRE to obtain discovery to establish
that Columbia's suit, although not baseless or frivolous, was in fact
motivated by a desire to drive PRE from the rn-room movie rental
market." 2 The court relied on Noerr, in which the Supreme Court held
with regard to lobbying that "even if the defendants' sole purpose in
seeking to influence the passage and enforcement of laws was to destroy the
truckers' business, the immunity remained. t' 11
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on somewhat different reasomng. "4 It
cited California Motor Transport for the proposition that sham litigation
manifests itself in two forms: either misrepresentations or "the pursuit of
'a pattern of baseless claims.""'" PRE did not contend that Colum-
bia's suit was baseless or that it involved misrepresentations; rather, PRE
argued that a litigation can be sham if it is not motivated by a good faith
desire to obtain relief.116 This view had precedential support from several
circuits. 7 Under this view, "[tlhe deterrmnative inquiry is not whether the
1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,971, at 63,243 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 1525 (9th




113. Id. (quoting Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690
F.2d 1240, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983)).
114. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944
F.2d "1525, 1528-32 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
115. Id. at 1529 (quoting California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 513 (1972)).
116. See id. at 1530.
117 Apparently, PRE primarily relied on In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988).
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suit was won or lost, but whether it was significantly motivated by a
genuine desire for judicial relief. [A] genuine desire for relief means
that the desire for relief must be both honest and reasonable." 8
The Ninth Circuit applied a much narrower definition of sham
litigation. Under the court's standard, the antitrust plaintiff must begin by
showing that the alleged sham litigation was baseless or meritless, but even
this showing is not sufficient if a single lawsuit is involved: "When the
antitrust plaintiff challenges one suit and not a pattern, a finding of sham
requires not only that the suit is baseless, but also that it has other
characteristics of grave abuse, such as being coupled with actions or effects
external to the suit that are themselves anti-competitive. "119
Given the Ninth Circuit's high threshold for proving sham litigation,
it was clear that PRE could not prevail as a matter of law 11 "Simply
stated," the Ninth Circuit concluded, "a suit brought with probable cause
does not fall within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine. "121
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
The United States Supreme Court then granted PRE's petition for
certiorari,' but ultimately affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling on the issue
of whether a nonfrivolous suit can satisfy the sham exception." After
recounting the case's complex procedural history, Justice Thomas's
majority opinion noted that the circuit courts were split on the issue: 4
118. Id. at 528-29.
119. Professional Real Estate Investors, 944 F.2d at 1530 (quoting Rickards v Canine
Eye Registration Found., Inc., 783 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.) (quoting Omni Resource
Dev. Corp. v. Conoco, Inc., 739 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
851 (1986)) (emphasis added by court). The Supreme Court did not endorse this demanding
standard for the sham exception. See infra notes 122-214 and accompanying text.
120. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 944 F.2d at 1531. The Ninth Circuit noted
that Columbia's copyright claim presented an issue of first impression and thus could not
meet the baselessness requirement. Id.
121. Id. at 1532. The court then affirmed the district court's determination that PRE
was not entitled to discovery on the issue of Columbia's subjective intent, which became
irrelevant under the Ninth Circuit's standard. See id. at 1532-33.
122. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 1557, 1557 (1992).
123. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113
S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (1993).
124. The Court's opinion cited three cases that clearly disagreed with the Ninth
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"The courts of appeals have defined 'sham' in inconsistent and contradicto-
ry ways. We once observed that 'sham' might become 'no more than a
label courts could apply to activity they deem unworthy of antitrust
immunity ' The array of definitions adopted by lower courts demonstrates
that this observation was prescient."'25
The Court began its analysis of the issue by summarizmg the
constitutional policy behind Noerr-Penmngton immunity-permitting parties
to petition the government for redress.'26 The Court then acknowledged
that California Motor Transport had left unresolved the issue of whether a
successful lawsuit can be a sham if it is brought for anticompetitive
purposes.'27 In particular, the opmion quoted several passages from
California Motor Transport that appeared to treat subjective intent as a
significant factor in assessing immunity; the Court dismissed this language
on the ground that although anticompetitive intent rmght be a necessary
condition for antitrust liability, it was not a sufficient condition.'2
Justice Thomas noted that Noerr refused to deem lobbying efforts as
sham even if the sole purpose of the lobbying was to destroy competitors.'29
Contrary to the view expressed by some lower courts and commentators,' 30
Circuit's view and seven cases that were consistent with that view. See id. at 1925 n.3
(citing cases). For commentary on the standards for sham litigation, see BORK, supra note
15, at 347 ("Predation by abuse of governmental procedures, including administrative and
judicial processes, presents an increasingly dangerous threat to competition. Antitrust law
is beginning to catch up with it, but the criteria that are to govern this field are not yet fully
formulated."); Myers, supra note 15, at 608-30 (discussing division among lower courts and
proposing cost-benefit standard for predatory litigation). Gary Minda notes:
[IThe current state of the [Noerr-Pennngton] doctrine has been characterized as
"uncertain," "inconsistent," "disintegrating," and an antitrust "quagmire."
The Supreme Court's case-by-case approach to this important area of antitrust
law has been unfruitful because adjudication has failed to raise, let alone
resolve, serious analytical difficulties at the core of the Noerr-Pennngton
doctrine.
Minda, supra note 29, at 910 (footnote omitted).
125. Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1925 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 n.10 (1988)).
126. See id. at 1926.
127 See rd. (discussing California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 510-12 (1972)).
128. See td. at 1926 n.4 (discussing California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512, 515).
129. See id. at 1926-27 (discussing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138-39, 143 (1961)).
130. See unfra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing predatory use of litigation).
1218
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1218 1994
PROFESSIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTORS
Justice Thomas found that California Motor Transport and later decisions
did not retreat from this position, at least in the context of litigation
behavior.' He then endorsed a broad proposition: that motive, as a basis
for either imposing or escaping liability, generally is not a determinative
factor m antitrust analysis.'3 2 The majority opimon concluded its rejection
of a purely subjective standard by noting that such a standard would not
provide "real 'intelligible gidance." 33
The Court then established a strict, two-part definition of sham
litigation that contains both an objective and a subjective prong."s The
antitrust plaintiff must first prove that the lawsuit was "objectively baseless
in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits."' 35 Second, the plaintiff must show that "the baseless lawsuit
conceals 'an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationslups of
a competitor,' through the 'use [of] the governmental process-as opposed
to the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon."6 The
Court described the second prong of its test as a subjective one that focuses
on the economic viability of the litigation as a weapon in the marketplace. 37
Applying its standard to the instant case, the Court found that PRE
could not show that Columbia's copyright claun was objectively unreason-
able. 3' "The existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings
precludes a finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham
litigation. "'39  The Court noted that Columbia had probable cause as a
matter of law, given the disagreement among the circuits regarding whether
131. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1927
132. See id. at 1927-28 (discussing numerous cases downplaying importance of
competitor's subjective intent).
133. Id. at 1928 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S.
492, 508 n.10 (1988)).
134. See id.
135. Id. The Court observed that a successful suit is, by definition, not baseless. See
id. at 1928 n.5. Moreover, even an unsuccessful suit may have been reasonably grounded
in law and fact when it was initiated. See id.
136. Id. at 1928 (citation omitted) (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961), and City of Columbia v Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991)) (first emphasis added by court).
137 See rd. The Court then noted that an antitrust plaintiff that meets the two-part test
overcomes Noerr-Pennmgton imunity, but must still prove a substantive antitrust violation.
Id. This point is consistent with long-established law. See supra note 17
138. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1929-3 1.
139. Id. at 1929.
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and m what circumstances rn-room playing of copyrighted works constitutes
a public performance.' 40 "Columbia might have won its copyright suit in
either the Third or the Seventh Circuit. Even m the absence of supporting
authority, Columbia would have been entitled to press a novel copyright
claim as long as a similarly situated reasonable litigant could have perceived
some likelihood of success." 4 ' Justice Thomas concluded that because
Columbia had probable cause to institute its copyright suit, PRE was not
entitled to discovery as to Columbia's subjective intent, and Columbia was
immune from PRE's antitrust claims as a matter of law 142
D The Concurring Opinions
There were two concurring opimons rn Professional Real Estate
Investors: one by Justice Souter, who joined the majority opinion with
additional comments, and one by Justice Stevens, who concurred only in
the judgment and wrote separately 143
Justice Souter sought to clarify the majority's use of the term
"probable cause," which had also been used by the lower courts. 44 He
noted that the Court had announced its own test, which focused on whether
"a reasonable litigant could realistically have expected success on the
merits,"145 and suggested that the reference to "probable cause" was not
meant to alter the standard that the Court had just pronounced.'"
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor, expressly declined to join
the majority opinion and concurred only in the result. 47 Justice Stevens
agreed with the majority that an objective standard is appropriate for
assessing whether a firm's litigation behavior is sham and that Columbia's
suit was not sham.' He expressed concern, however, with the Court's
140. See td. at 1930. Indeed, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit's finding against
Columbia had been criticized by other circuits and by commentators. See id.
141. Id. at 1931.
142. See id.
143. See rd. at 1931-32 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 1932-36 (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment).
144. See id. at 1931-32 (Souter, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1931.
146. See id. at 1931-32. Justice Souter also noted that the majority's references to tort
and Rule 11 remedies for baseless suits should not be read to import the rules in these areas
of law into the Noerr-Pennington arena. See id. at 1932.
147 See id. at 1932, 1936 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
148. See rd. at 1932-33.
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definition of the sham standard.149 Under the majority's standard, the
litigation is immune if a "reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits."" Justice Stevens stated: "There might well be
lawsuits that fit [this] definition but can be shown to be objectively
unreasonable, and thus shams. It rmght not be objectively reasonable to
bring a lawsuit just because some form of success on the merits-no matter
how insignificant-could be expected."'' Justice Stevens noted that
Columbia's copyright claim against PRE was clearly well grounded and
thus constituted a clear case of immune petitioning activity 152 He
concluded: "I would not, however, use this easy case as a vehicle for
announcing a rule that may govern the decision of difficult cases, some of
which may involve abuse of the judicial process." 53
IV Evaluating the Professional Real Estate Investors Test
The Supreme Court's opinion in Professional Real Estate Investors laid
to rest some unresolved issues in cases alleging predatory litigation. The
Court announced a two-part test that the antitrust plaintiff must satisfy in
order to overcome Noerr-Pennngton immunity" (1) that a reasonable
litigant could not realistically expect success on the merits and (2) that the
litigation is being used to attain economic objectives." 4 If the lawsuit or
lawsuits in question involve situations in which a "reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits,"'55 then Noerr-Pennngton
immunity applies, regardless of the litigant's subjective purpose.'5 6
Nonetheless, the Professional Real Estate Investors decision leaves a
number of other important issues unresolved. Moreover, the two-part
standard is problematic m several respects. This section of the Article will
address these issues.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1932 (quoting majority opinion, id. at 1928).
151. Id. Justice Stevens questioned whether a lawsuit that involved 10 years of
litigation and two appeals to collect one dollar from the defendant would be immune under
the majority's standard. See id. at 1932 n.2 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 575
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (involving civil rights suit in which plaintiff recovered
one dollar from one of six defendants after 10 years of litigation and two appeals)).
152. See id. at 1933.
153. Id. at 1936.
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A. Vagueness of the Majority's Two-Part Test
The Supreme Court's announcement of the two-part test was
somewhat clouded by its discussion and application of that test. All of the
Justices agreed that the standard should be one of objective reasonable-
ness. 11 Yet the majority defined and described the objective prong of the
standard in several different ways. First, Justice Thomas stated that the
standard depends on whether there was an "objectively reasonable effort
to litigate." 158 Next, he described the issue as whether the litigation
"constitute[s] the pursuit of claims so baseless that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect to secure favorable relief";59 then he referred to
whether the suit is "objectively baseless" and whether "probable cause"
exists."6 Finally, he applied the standard and, citing the language of Rule
11, concluded that "Columbia's copyright action was arguably 'warranted
by existing law "161
Both Justice Souter and Justice Stevens questioned the majority's
discussion of the objective standard.' 62 Justice Souter's concern was that
the reference to other language, such as "probable cause" and the Rule 11
standard, should not blur the actual standard that the Court announced,
even though the majority seemed to treat the terms as interchangeable. 63
Justice Stevens's disagreement with the majority was much more
fundamental and pronounced, but he also questioned the majority's use of
terminology 164 The use of terms of art, such as "objectively baseless,"
157 See id. at 1926; id. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 1932 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
158. Id. at 1926.
159. Id. at 1929.
160. Id. at 1928, 1929.
161. Id. at 1930 (quoting FED. R. Civ P 11). The Rule 11 standard is often referred
to as a "frivolousness" standard. See, e.g., Rush v McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104,
1122 (7th Cir. 1992); Magnus Elecs., Inc. v Masco Corp., 871 F.2d 626, 629 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156,
1159 (9th Cir. 1987); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel
v Aronoff, 638 F Supp. 714, 725-26 (S.D.N.Y 1986).
162. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1931-32 (Souter, J.,
concurring); id. at 1932 & n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
163. See id. at 1931-32 (Souter, J., concurring); mfra notes 289-305 and accompanying
text (discussing Rule 11 standard).
164. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1932 & n.1 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting various versions of Court's standard).
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"probable cause," and "warranted by existing law," creates ambiguity as
to the meaning of the first prong of the Court's definition of the sham
exception. Presumably, a lawsuit that is baseless, that lacks probable
cause,165 or that is unwarranted by existing law (or, possibly, a nonfrivol-
ous argument for changing the law)"6 could fall within the sham exception
to Noerr-Pennngton.
What is therefore left unclear is whether the lawsuit must be frivolous
in one or more of these ways in order to fail the Court's announced
test-whether a "reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits. "167 A party can reasonably expect to lose a lawsuit even
though the suit is not entirely frivolous. Thus, an antitrust plaintiff might
be able to prove sham litigation under the Court's standard without
demonstrating that the suit was frivolous. Even under the standard
presented mn the majority opinion in Professional Real Estate Investors, the
plaintiff should only be required to show that the lawsuit in question was
unreasonable-in other words, that it was not reasonably expected to be
successful.
Application of such a standard to the facts of Professional Real Estate
Investors indicates that Columbia's copyright claim against PRE was
reasonable. Indeed, the suit had a substantial chance of success. In the
Supreme Court's own evaluation of Columbia's copyright suit, it noted
165. The term "probable cause" is used, inter aia, in the law of malicious prosecution.
See W PAGE KEEON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119, at 871,
876-82, § 120, at 893-94 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (discussing
element of "probable cause" in malicious prosecution actions). The term itself has several
differing meanings; some courts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for instance, require
that the party instituting the proceeding have a subjective belief in the validity of the claim
or charge. PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 119, at 877 (citing cases and RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 662, cmt. c (1977)). Most courts, however, apply an objective
standard. Id. at 876-77
166. See FED. R. Crv P 11. Rule II states in relevant part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
mod#fcation, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law
FED. R. Civ P 11(b)(2) (emphasis added). An extensive body of cases and literature has
developed concerning the meaning of this, as well as prior, Rule 11 terminology See
generally infra notes 289-305 and accompanying text.
167 Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
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that the movie studio might have prevailed under the law in the Third and
Seventh Circuits." Thus, the suit was far from frivolous; it was in fact
reasonable to expect that it might be successful. Under a broad reasonable-
ness standard, Columbia's suit would be immune. It was unnecessary for
the Court to evaluate whether Columbia's suit was baseless. If baselessness
were the standard, Columbia could arguably bring suit in the Ninth Circuit
even if the Third and Seventh Circuits' rulings went squarely against it;
Columbia could argue that it justifiably sought a different rule in the Ninth
Circuit, even though the objective likelihood of that result was slim.
Several recent lower court decisions have applied the Professional Real
Estate Investors standard. Most of these decisions have assumed that an
antitrust plaintiff can establish the sham exception only by proving that the
defendant's lawsuit was baseless, as if any suit that is not completely
baseless is necessarily reasonable. For example, in Carroll Touch, Inc. v
Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc. ,169 Carroll Touch, Inc. (Carroll Touch)
claimed that Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc. (EMS) had infringed its
patent on a device that permits computer users to enter commands by
touching the computer screen. 70 Counterclaung, EMS alleged that the
patent suit was predatory and in violation of antitrust and unfair competition
law 171 Specifically, EMS argued that Carroll Touch brought the patent
claim in order to gain trade secret information, to harm EMS as a
competitor, and to deter potential entrants into the market.'I
Applying Professional Real Estate Investors, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Noerr-Pennington immunity
applied." Even though the patent suit was rejected as a matter of law, the
court held that EMS failed to establish that Carroll Touch's lawsuit fell
within the sham exception. 4 Because EMS could not prove that the patent
claim was "objectively baseless or frivolous," the court held that the patent
suit was immune under Noerr-Pennington as a matter of law '71
168. Id. at 1931.
169. 15 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
170. See Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1575-76
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
171. Id. at 1576.
172. Id. at 1582.
173. See id. at 1582-83.
174. See id. at 1583.
175. Id.
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Another post-Professional Real Estate Investors appellate decision
interpreting the two-part test is Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v Magnu-
son.176 In that case, a shopping center owner mounted environmental law
challenges to a proposed new shopping development."' 7 All of the
environmental claims were rejected by the courts and agencies involved, 78
and the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the claims lacked "overwhelming
strength, '17 which appears to be something of an understatement. The
Ninth Circuit expressly indicated that the sham standard required a showing
"that a lawsuit is baseless and that the suit was brought as part of an
anticompetitive plan external to the underlying litigation.",,'
A number of other cases have explicitly described the first prong of the
Professional Real Estate Investors test as a requirement that the allegedly
predatory litigation be baseless or frivolous.' Similarly, most practitioner
commentary on Professional Real Estate Investors has emphasized the
Court's discussion of baselessness in reaching its result."s
176. 12 F.3d 155 (9th Cir. 1993).
177 See Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 156 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 77 (1994).
178. See ut.
179. Id. at 158.
180. Id. at 157
181. See, e.g., El Cajon Cinemas, Inc. v American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 832 F Supp.
1395, 1398 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that antitrust plaintiff must prove that litigation
"constituted the pursuit of a baseless claim"); Whelan v Abell, 827 F Supp. 801, 803-04
(D.D.C. 1993) (applying Professional Real Estate Investors standard to state tort claims and
requiring proof that claim was "objectively baseless"), dismissed, 1993 WL 410900 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 6, 1993); see also Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v Hoffineyer, 834 F Supp. 256,
261 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that first prong requires "baseless lawsuit"). The district court
m Hoffineyer imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Hofflneyer for bringing antitrust and other
federal counterclaims; hence, Hoffineyer's claim of predatory litigation was itself found to
be frivolous. Id. at 263. Hoffineyer was actually a fairly clear case of immune petitioning
activity The plaintiff's copyright claim had survived two motions for summary judgment:
"An action that is well enough grounded, factually and legally, to survive a motion for
summary judgment is sufficiently meritorious to lead a reasonable litigant to conclude that
they had some chance of success on the merits." Id. at 261-62.
182. See generally Antitrust Immunity for Filing Suit-Supreme Court Narrowly Defines
"Sham," 8 FED. LITIGATOR 166 (1993) (discussing majority's standard and views of
concurring Justices); Leonard M. Niehoff, The "Sham" Exception to Noerr-Pennington, 72
MICH. B.J. 708 (1993) (referring to "probable cause" standard); Supreme Court Provides
New Two-Part Definition of Antitrust "Sham," COMPUTER LAW., June 1993, at 34 (referring
to "probable cause" standard).
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The second prong of the majority's definition of sham litigation focuses
on the economic viability of the alleged predatory litigation, which the
antitrust plaintiff must also prove:
[T]he court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi-
tor," through the "use [of] the governmental process-as opposed to the
outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon." This two-tiered
process requires the plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit's legal
viability before the court will entertain evidence of the suit's economic
viability Of course, even a plaintiff who defeats the defendant's claim to
Noerr immunity by demonstrating both the objective and the subjective
components of a sham must still prove a substantive antitrust violation."
Thus, the second prong of the Professional Real Estate Investors test
involves what the Court calls a "subjective" element, which considers
whether the litigation was used as an economic weapon."s It would seem
that almost any litigation behavior that fails the first prong of the Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors test would at least arguably fail the second
prong as well. In other words, if the litigation behavior was objectively
unreasonable, it must have been initiated or maintained for anticompetitive
or other improper purposes. Given that the antitrust plaintiff will have to
prove a substantive antitrust violation in order to prevail, that party should
always be able to claim that it proved the second prong of the sham
exception. In short, given the strict requirement under the first prong of
the Court's tst, the second prong seems redundant.
B. The Narrow Definition of Unreasonableness
As discussed in the previous subpart, many courts have interpreted and
will interpret Professional Real Estate Investors to require that the antitrust
plaintiff prove that the challenged litigation was baseless or frivolous in
order to invoke the sham exception. This definition of unreasonableness is
overly narrow because it unnecessarily permits the use of litigation as an
anticompetitive tool.
The difficulty with the narrow definition of sham litigation is best
illustrated by a hypothetical case illustration. Although this particular
183. Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928 (citations omitted) (quoting
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961), and City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380
(1991)) (first emphasis added by court).
184. See id.
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example is fictional, there are many cases that involve similar facts."
Assume that Megadata is a large firm in the computer industry; the firm
holds a substantial share of the market, has market power, and enjoys the
fruits of proprietary technology protected under patent, copyright, and trade
secret law Megadata wishes to exclude competition in its markets, but
recognizes that some predatory practices would be readily challenged by
present and potential competitors. Thus, for example, if Megadata engaged
m predatory pricing, its actions would be detected and could be proven in
court using cost data. Instead, Megadata sues actual or potential competi-
tors and alleges, for instance, that they violated patents or copyrights.
The likelihood that Megadata's intellectual property claims would
succeed in court is small, although the likelihood is high enough that
Megadata's suits could not be labeled as baseless or frivolous. Perhaps
Megadata has a ten percent chance of success on the merits because it is
unlikely that Megadata's patent or copyright was infringed. If it is
successful, it can collect damages, costs, and possibly attorneys fees having
a total present value of $250,000; thus, the expected value of the litigation
is $25,000 ($250,000 discounted for the ten percent chance of prevailing).
If Megadata loses, it will spend $50,000 on litigation expenses. Megadata
would typically conclude that the expected recovery from the litigation
would not justify the rnety percent probability that the suit will fail and
that it will bear substantial litigation costs."S
185. For examples of the predatory use of intellectual property claims, see CVD, Inc.
v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (Ist Cir. 1985) (involving trade secret claims), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Grip-Pak, Inc. v Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466,
471 (7th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Handgards, Inc. v Ethicon,
Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1979) (involving patent infringement claims), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). See also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (involving use of fraudulently obtained patent to
eliminate competitor). Other cases involve misuse of regulatory challenges. See Otter Tail
Power Co. v United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973) (electric utility monopoly used
litigation to deter entry of competitors); Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155,
156-58 (9th Cir. 1993) (shopping center owner sponsored weak environmental lawsuits
against potential competitor), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 77 (1994); Litton Sys., Inc. v
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1983) (telephone company used
regulatory challenges to eliminate competitor), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
186. This example is based on an economic analysis of predatory litigation. See
Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1935-36 (Stevens, I., concurring in
judgment) (discussing use of litigation to obtain economic objectives); Grip-Pak, Inc. v
Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (same), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Myers, supra note 15, at 602-06 (same); see also Klein, supra
note 15, at 29 ("The case law frequently defines sham litigation as anticompetitive litigation
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On these facts, Megadata would not be acting as a reasonable litigant
if it brought the lawsuit against its actual or potential competitors. In other
words, if the only benefits accruing to Megadata were from the favorable
outcome m litigation, then the lawsuit's costs exceed its benefits. If, on the
other hand, the lawsuit would generate collateral or outside benefits, then
Megadata nught bring the lawsuit. These additional benefits make litigation
an anticompetitive weapon. The threat or use of litigation may delay or
deter new entry and may thereby permit Megadata to continue to earn
monopolistic profits. When litigation is used in this manner, it should not
be cloaked m Noerr-Pennngton inmunity To quote Professional Real
Estate Investors, Megadata would be using litigation "'to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor,' through the 'use [of] the
governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an
anticompetitive weapon.""'n
Whether Megadata's actions would be immune depends on an
interpretation of the Professional Real Estate Investors two-part test.
Applying the Court's test, Megadata's target could claim (1) that given the
ten percent chance of prevailing on the patent or copyright claim, a
reasonable litigant could not realistically expect to succeed on the merits
and (2) that Megadata is using the litigation to achieve collateral, improper,
and anticompetitive goals.
In response, Megadata, focusing on whether its clain was baseless,
could rely on language in Professional Real Estate Investors that notes that
"[tihe existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes
a finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation. "188
Given that it had "some likelihood of success," '89 albeit only ten percent,
Megadata is arguably immune. If this language is viewed as part of the
Court's holding, then Megadata will prevail m the antitrust suit. This
ambiguity is the central unresolved issue m Justice Thomas's majority
opinion, and it is a major concern of Justice Stevens m his separate
concurrence. 190
that is either 'baseless' or fraudulent, whereas economic analysis emphasizes the anti-
competitive goals that motivate the use of government processes to attack rivals.").
187 Professwnal Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928 (citation omitted) (quoting
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, and Omm Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. at 380) (first emphasis
added by court).
188. Id. at 1929
189. Id. at 1931.
190. See ud. at 1932-33 (Stevens, I., concurring m judgment).
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Tis issue will probably arise frequently In light of Professional Real
Estate Investors, it is unlikely that an antitrust plaintiff would challenge a
large firm's litigation if that firm has a strong claim, even one that
ultimately fails. Professional Real Estate Investors itself seems like such
a case. At the other extreme, if the litigation is baseless, then the plaintiff
can very likely meet the first and second prongs of the sham exception.
Yet much allegedly predatory litigation will fall into the intermediate
category- weak, but not wholly baseless,19' claims that can serve as
economic tools for large firms seeking to harm competitors.
C. Other Unresolved Issues
1. Litigation Fraud
Although the Court in Professional Real Estate Investors announced a
two-part test for litigation behavior generally, it expressly did not deal with
situations involving litigation fraud or other unethical conduct. 19 Justice
Thomas's opinion quoted language from California Motor Transport
regarding "forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt
the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust
violations." 93 He then declined to address these cases: "We need not
decide here whether and, if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition
of antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud or other misrepresentations. ""9
Fraud or misrepresentations committed during or in connection with
litigation should be treated under a separate analysis. Often these cases
arise in connection with patent applications that have allegedly been
obtained through fraud or misrepresentations. Because many patent
proceedings are ex parte, applicants are able to obtain patents while
misstating or failing to disclose material information. The Supreme Court
addressed such a situation in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp.95 In that case, Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp. (Food Machinery) secured a patent on a sewage treatment system,
which it threatened to enforce against a competitor, Walker Process
191. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
192. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1929 n.6.
193. Id. (quoting Californa Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
513 (1972)).
194. Id.
195. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
1229
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1229 1994
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1199 (1994)
Equipment, Inc. (Walker).1" Food Machinery sued Walker for patent
infringement when Walker entered the market; Walker counterclaimed and
asserted that Food Machinery was attempting to monopolize the market."g
Walker claimed that the patent was obtained fraudulently because Food
Machinery had attested that the invention had not been in public use for
more than one year before the patent application was filed, when in fact it
had been publicly used for more than one year."9 ' The Supreme Court held
that Walker properly stated an antitrust claim under section 2 of the
Sherman Act.'
In Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court favorably cited Walker
Process, as well as language in California Motor Transport that suggests a
strict stance against litigation fraud: "[M]isrepresentations, condoned in the
political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory pro-
cess." 2° Thus, if an antitrust plaintiff has a factual basis for asserting that
misrepresentations were used as part of a predatory litigation strategy, the
plaintiff may be able to avoid application of the two-part sham test
announced in Professional Real Estate Investors.
2. The Single "Sham" Lawsuit
An issue that has been heavily litigated in the lower courts is whether
a single lawsuit can satisfy the sham exception. Much of the confusion on
this issue stemmed from the Supreme Court's discussion of the sham
196. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
173 (1965).
197 See id. at 173-74.
198. See id. at 174.
199. See d. at 176-77 Walker could prevail by showing that the patent was obtained
by intentional fraud and then establishing the elements of a monopolization claim. See id.
at 177
200. Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1929 n.6 (quoting California
Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972), and citing Walker
Process, 382 U.S. at 176-77). See generally Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d
155, 158-60 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing litigation fraud in context of dispute between two
competing shopping center developers),-cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 77 (1994). The Ninth
Circuit in Magnuson recognized that the two-part test would be inapplicable if the antitrust
plaintiff could prove that "a party's knowing fraud upon, or its misrepresentations to, the
court deprive[d] the litigation of its legitimacy " Id. at 159. The Magnuson court found no
evidence of fraud on the particular facts presented to it. Id. at 159-60; see also TRW Fin.
Sys., Inc. v Unisys Corp., 835 F Supp. 994, 1013-14 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (recognizing
fraud exception and finding no evidence of fraud on facts presented).
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exception m California Motor Transport. In that case, the Court stated:
"One claim, which a court or agency may tink baseless, may go
unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which
leads the factfinder to conclude that the admiustrative and judicial
processes have been abused.""' This reference to a pattern of claims
appears to be an illustration of one form of sham litigation, along with
perjury, patent fraud, and bribery I
Most lower courts and commentators have recognized that a single
lawsuit could fall within the sham exception.' Other courts, however,
have concluded that one lawsuit generally cannot constitute a sham. 2t ' The
201. Californa Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
202. See id. at 512-13.
203. See Aydin Corp. v Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1983); MCI
Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1154-55 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Energy Conservation, Inc. v Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d
386, 388 (9th Cir. 1983); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
690 F.2d 1240, 1254-57 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Feminist
Women's Health Ctr. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 924 (1979); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F Supp. 514, 520 (D.
Minn. 1979), afO'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981); see
also Coastal States Mktg., Inc. Y. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1369 n.37 (5th Cir. 1983). For
commentary, see Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFF L.
REv 39, 55-56 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence
Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennmgton Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L.
REv 80, 109-10 (1977); Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 101 & n.161 (citing several
commentators); Myers, supra note 15, at 619-24.
204. See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that pattern of baseless, repetitive claims is required under California Motor
Transport); Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 1982)
("A sham action is something more than an action instituted without probable cause.");
Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v City of Pontiac, 612 F Supp. 654, 663 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(holding that single suit would be insufficient), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 792 F.2d
563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986); MCI Communications Corp. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F Supp. 1072, 1103 (N.D. I1.), aft'd, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co.,
428 F Supp. 951, 955-56 (D. Conn. 1977); Central Bank v. Clayton Bank, 424 F Supp.
163, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977); see also Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 487 (8th
Cir. 1985) (holding that single suit does not fall within sham exception absent evidence of
access barring, i.e., ethical misconduct); Omni Resource Dev. Corp. v Conoco, Inc., 739
F.2d 1412, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring showing of pattern of litigation or grave
misconduct); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979) (requiring
pattern of baseless litigation and access barring), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); First
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confusion arose because of Justice Douglas's reference to a "pattern of
baseless claims" as an example of unlawful activity in Califorma
Motor Transport.2 5 In Hydro-Tech Corp. v Sundstrand Corp. ,206 for in-
stance, the plaintiff's antitrust claim was based on Sundstrand's unsuccess-
ful trade secret claim against it.2 7 The plaintiff contended that the trade
secret suit lacked probable cause and was brought for the purpose of
interfering with its business in order to maintain Sundstrand's monopoly 208
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that "sham
litigation" involves a gross abuse of process, which requires more than the
filing of a baseless lawsuit with anticompetitive intent.Y The court
indicated that the antitrust plaintiff must show "a pattern of baseless
actions [or] bribery, perjury, denial of access to the courts, or the
like, as those several matters are referred to in California Motor
Transport. 210
In light of Professional Real Estate Investors, it is clear that the
plaintiff in cases such as Hydro-Tech would be able to state a claim.
Having alleged that the litigation lacked merit and was brought for
anticompetitive purposes, the plaintiff in that case and cases like it?"
would satisfy the new two-part test for sham litigation. The Court in
Professional Real Estate Investors, although not stating the point expressly,
Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F Supp. 514, 521 (D. Minn. 1979) (holding that
absent evidence of ethical misconduct-perjury, fraud, or bribery-single suit is not sham),
aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).
205. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513.
206. 673 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1982).
207 Hydro-Tech Corp. v Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 1982).
208. 1d. at 1174-75.
209. See id. at 1176 & n.6.
210. Id. at 1175.
211. Previous decisions from other courts have required a showing of improper acts,
such as bribery or perjury, but Professional Real Estate Investors clearly does not require
such a showing. See Ad Visor, Inc. v Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 640 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th
Cir. 1981) (observing that establishment of sham requires proof of "improper interference
with adminitrative or judicial process"); First Nat'l Bank v Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F
Supp. 514, 521 (D. Minn. 1979) ("The institution of a single lawsuit without any allega-
tions that the lawsuit involves ethical misconduct similar to the abuses described in
California Transport is not sufficient to bring the defendants' actions within the 'sham
exception' to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine."), aff'd 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981); Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v Norwalk Vault Co., 428
F Supp. 951, 954-56 (D. Conn. 1977) (discussing need for showing of "corrupt" practices).
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clearly recognized that one suit can satisfy the sham exception. Nothing
in its two-part test refers to a requirement of a pattern of lawsuits or
multiple claims.212
Another line of now-questionable cases relied on Justice Douglas's
language in California Motor Transport to require a showing that the
challenged actions constituted "access barmng"-that is, depriving the
target of meaningful access to a tribunal or agency 213 The Court in
Professional Real Estate Investors did not directly raise the issue; again,
its newly announced standard and its analysis do not discuss access
barring.
214
Thus, the Court seems to have resolved some of the ambiguities that
have existed m the law since the California Motor Transport decision. If
an antitrust plaintiff can establish that the defendant used one or more
objectively unreasonable lawsuits for anticompetitive purposes, the
requirements of the sham exception are satisfied; the plaintiff can then
seek to prove the elements of a substantive antitrust violation. The
plaintiff is not required to prove that multiple predatory lawsuits were
212. The Court's announcement of the two-part test repeatedly refers to the "suit" and
"lawsuit" in singular terms; furthermore, the opinion imposes no requirement of multiple
suits. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
213. See, e.g., Hufsmith v Weaver, 817 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring
access barring or improper acts); Affiliated Capital Corp. v City of Houston, 735 F.2d
1555, 1567-68 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (observing in dictum that sham exception involves
denial of meaningful access to government entity), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986);
Miracle Mile Assocs. v City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[Alccess-
barring is the cornerstone to the sham exception." (quoting Wilmorite, Inc. v Eagan Real
Estate, Inc., 454 F Supp. 1124, 1134-35 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1372 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978))); Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F Supp. at 520-21
(requiring either access barring or ethical misconduct); see also Handgards, Inc. v Ethicon,
Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 998 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Franchise Realty might
be interpreted to require that the defendant's conduct was designed to cause competitive
injury by exacting such extraordinary costs that meaningful use of an agency or tribunal was
barred "), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v
San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd., 542 F.2d 1076, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 1976) (arguably
implying that plaintiff must show access barring), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
Commentators have questioned these decisions. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 101-02 &
n.163 (citing commentators); Myers, supra note 15, at 610-11 (observing that access barring
should not be required); see also Balmer, supra note 203, at 47-48 (persuasively arguing that
later Supreme Court decisions reject requirement that antitrust plaintiff show access barring).
214. Justice Thomas mentioned "access barring" in his historical discussion of
California Motor Transport, but did not include it in the two-part test for sham litigation.
See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1927-29.
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filed, that fraudulent conduct was involved, or that access barring took
place. On the other hand, the meaning of the Court's objective standard
remains unclear, particularly on the issue of whether the underlying
litigation must be frivolous to constitute a sham. Finally, the contours of
the fraud exception to Noerr-Pennington remain unclear.
V Ramifications Beyond Antitrust Law
A. The First Amendment Right to Petition
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is
expressly protected in the Petition Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.215 Historical antecedents of the Petition Clause
can be found m the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence." 6
In 1875, the Supreme Court discussed the Petition Clause in United States
v Cruikshank217 and stated that "[t]he very idea of a government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for
a redress of grievances."2 " Justice Black described the right as "among
the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights"2" 9 and
later as a "fundamental right."" °
One of the landmark cases in this area is NAACP v Button," which
held that the freedoms of association and speech, and the concomitant right
to petition the courts, are constitutionally guaranteed under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.' Although NAACP v Button involved the
NAACP's political action through the mechanism of the courts, later
decisions recognized that the right to petition extends to those who act for
215. U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
216. See Christina M. Spitzer, Note, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrne, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 332 n.25 (1984) (quoting historical references to
petitioning rights from Magna Carta and Declaration of Independence).
217 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
218. United States v Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
219 United Mine Workers v Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
220. United Transp. Union v State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
221. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
222. See NAACP v Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963) (holding unconstitutional
Virginia statute barring attorney solicitation of clients).
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economic reasons as well.' As stated in Thomas v Collins,224 "[t]he
grievances for redress of which the right to petition was insured, and with
it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the
rights of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of
human interest. "I
Noerr identifies two values furthered by the right to petition. The
first focuses on securing the citizenry's need to present grievances to the
government, and the second highlights the government's need for
information from interested parties in order to ensure informed decision
making. 26 In many ways, these values are analogous to the free speech
interests of the speaker to present information and of the audience to
receive it.' Moreover, the right to petition is closely linked to the right
of association because parties are often more effective in petitioning as a
group rather than individually In fact, the right of association (in order
to petition the government) was principally at stake in NAACP v. Button."
Similarly, California Motor Transport discussed protection for litigation
223. See California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972) (holding that trucking firms' litigation against competitors was protected under
Petition Clause unless it constituted sham); United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 584-86
(holding that union members have right of access to courts); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1964) (holding that First
Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad workers right
to litigate personal injury claims through union-recommended attorney).
224. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
225. Thomas v Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
226. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 139 (1961); see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743
(1983) ("The first amendment interests involved in private litigation-compensation for
violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, public airmg of
disputed facts-are not advanced when the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on
knowingly frivolous claims." (quoting Balmer, supra note 203, at 60)); Fischel, supra note
203, at 98 (discussing values underpinning right to petition). Daniel R. Fischel's article
insightfully analyzes the immunity cases and anticipates the result in Professional Real Estate
Investors. See tl. at 105-06 ("[Vialuable speech is not deprived of first amendment
protection by the speaker's improper motive."). Fischel argues that immunity should extend
to legitimate petitioning, regardless of motive. Id. at 106.
227 See Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 CoLUM. L. REV 119 (1989).
228. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963); Fischel, supra note 203, at
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under the "rights of association and of petition" in tandem because the
trucking firms in that case had joined together to assert their claims.2 9
There is sparse commentary on the right to petition generally or the
right of access to the courts m particular. Danel R. Fischel describes the
right of access to the courts (as opposed to the legislative and executive
branches) as "long shrouded in uncertainty."" Edmund G. Brown has
noted that "the legal limits of 'proper' petitiomng are unclear, and there
are some doubts even as to basic principles."''i Of the few cases
interpreting the right to litigate, most specifically deal with the due process
rights of indigent prisoners seeking access to the courts.Y'
Before Professional Real Estate Investors, the Supreme Court's last
and most direct treatment of the Petition Clause was in McDonald v
Smith. 33 In that case, the defendant sent the President and others
defamatory letters about the plaintiff, who was under consideration for a
post as United States Attorney "-4 After the plaintiff failed to get the
nomination, he sued for defamation. 35 The defendant asserted that the
229. California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-12
(1972).
230. Fischel, supra note 203, at 97 n.99. For additional commentary, see generally
Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging "- An Analysis of the Neglected, but
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REv 1153 (1986) (presenting overview
of Petition Clause and criticism of Supreme Court's narrow reading of it in McDonald v
Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985)); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to
Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986) (presenting
historical overview of right to petition); Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication of
the Noerr-Pennmgton Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV
1243 (1984) (arguing that "absolute" petitioning immunity should not be applied outside
antitrust field and anticipating result in McDonald v. Smith). See also Lee A. Strunbeck,
Note, The Right to Petition, 55 W VA. L. REv 275, 276 (1953) ("The paucity of holdings
directly founded on this right led Mr. Justice Story to describe it with meaningless verbiage
and Mr. Cooley to state, 'Happily the occasions for discussing and defending it have not
been numerous in this country '" (footnote omitted)).
231. Edmund G. Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8 UCLA
L. REV 729, 731 (1961).
232. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578-80 (1974) (discussing
prisoner's right of access to courts under Due Process Clause). See generally Bounds v
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312
U.S. 546 (1941).
233. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
234. See McDonald v Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1985).
235. See id.
1236
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1236 1994
PROFESSIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTORS
Petition Clause afforded him absolute immunity from liability for
defamation. 6
After recounting the history of the petitioning right, Chief Justice
Burger noted that it was not absolute. 7  He cited California Motor
Transport and Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB" 8 for the
proposition that the Petition Clause does not immunize baseless litiga-
tion.23 9  He then noted that liability can be imposed for defamatory
statements, at least when a showing of intentional or reckless falsehood is
made.2' This, of course, is the New York Times Co. v Sullivan"4 "actual
malice" standard.242 Chief Justice Burger then refused to apply absolute
immunity to the defendant's statements, even though they were made in
the form of petitions to the President and other political leaders.24 To do
so "would elevate the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status.
The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty
and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assem-
ble. "2 Thus, although the defendant would not be liable for defamation
unless he acted with actual malice, McDonald v Smith refused to
recognize an absolute privilege based on the Petition Clause.245
236. Id. at 481-82.
237 See id. at 482-85.
238. 461 U.S. 731 (1983). For further discussion of Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
v NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), see infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
239. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 (citing Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743,
and California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)).
240. See id.
241. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
242. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that
defamatory statement regarding public officials is actionable only upon proof that it was
made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not"). Presumably, the plaintiff in McDonald, as a would-be public official or a limited-
purpose public figure, would be required to meet the actual malice standard.
243. See McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
244. Id. Chief Justice Burger continued: "These First Amendment rights are
inseparable, and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to
statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
245. See id. For commentary on McDonald v. Smith, see Smith, supra note 230, at
1153 (arguing that Petition Clause should provide absolute immunity from defamation and
criticizing McDonald v. Smith). See also Zauzmer, supra note 230, at 1245, 1265-71
(arguing that actual malice rule should apply to defamatory petitions and anticipating result
in McDonald v. Smith).
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McDonald v Smith confirms that petitioning immunity is an important
constitutional doctrine, one that is coterminous with the other First
Amendment protections. But the decision leaves open the question of the
applicability of the Petition Clause to areas of law other than defamation.
In defamation law, the Supreme Court has already struck a balance between
the state and individual interests in protecting reputation, on the one hand,
and the First Amendment-based need for a free press and free speech, on
the other hand. New York Times v Sullivan and its progeny have resolved
those issues, and McDonald v Smith held that the Petition Clause does not
change that balance. No siilar constitutional balance has been struck with
regard to the tort of abuse of process, Rule 11, or various other statutes and
rules governing the conduct of litigation. Professional Real Estate Investors
may provide some guidance on how that balance should be struck, as will
be discussed below
B. Noerr-Penmngton as a First Amendment Doctrine
The Supreme Court's opinions m Noerr and Pennington, as well as
their progeny, indisputably have a constitutional component. In Noerr, the
Court explicitly referred to the First Amendment concerns that would arise
if the Sherman Act penalized legitimate petitioning activity-
The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of
their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot
properly be made to depend upon their intent m doing so. A
construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking
a public position on matters in which they are financially interested would
deprive the people of their right to petition in the very instances in
which that right may be of the most imaportance to them.2'
In essence, the Court in Noerr employed a standard canon of statutory
construction by avoiding constitutional considerations through a narrow
interpretation of the Sherman Act.247
To the extent there was any doubt about the constitutional grounding
for Noerr-Pennington immunity, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowl-
edged its First Amendment basis in California Motor Transport.2 In that
246. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
139 (1961).
247 See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
248. See California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-12
(1972).
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case, the Court held that "it would be destructive of rights of association
and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without
violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and
federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view "249
Similarly, in Professional Real Estate Investors itself, Justice Thomas
repeatedly referred to the First Amendment interests at stake in the case and
the need to avoid infringing upon the right to petition.5' Indeed,
Professional Real Estate Investors specifically noted that the protective
principles of Noerr have been invoked in other contexts: "[W]e have
repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose
alone cannot transform otherwise legitimate activity into a sham.""' The
opinion cited NAACP v Claiborne Hardware Co.' and Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB 3 in support of this proposition. 4
Bill Johnson's Restaurants is undoubtedly the broadest application of
the Noerr principle. That case involved the issue of whether an "improper-
ly motivated" lawsuit could be enjoined as an unfair labor practice under
the National Labor Relations Act. 5 Drawing a parallel to Noerr in the
antitrust field, the Supreme Court held that no injunction could be granted
unless the challenged litigation behavior was "baseless." 6 This application
of Noerr in the disparate field of labor law demonstrates its potentially
broad reach. Moreover, Justice White's opinion in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants treats Noerr and California Motor Transport as analytical
benchmarks for the First Amendment, analogous to New York Times and its
progeny- "Just as false statements are not immunized by the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech, baseless litigation is not imnmunized
by the First Amendment right to petition. "I
Claiborne Hardware dealt with a civil suit challenging the NAACP's
economic boycott of Mississippi businesses owned by whites 25S Noting that
249. Id. at510-11.
250. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1926-27 (referring to First
Amendment right to petition).
251. Id. at 1927
252. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
253. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
254. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1927
255. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743-44 (1983).
256. See id.
257 Id. at 743 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
258. See NAACP v Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888-90 (1982).
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the NAACP and the other defendants were exercising rights of speech,
assembly, association, and petition, Justice Stevens concluded for the Court
that the defendants could not be liable under state antitrust or tort law for
economic losses that the boycott caused. 59 In discussing the defendants'
First Amendment rights, the Court discussed Noerr extensively I0
The constitutional analysis developed in Noerr, California Motor
Transport, and Professional Real Estate Investors establishes that the First
Amendment right to petition constrains the types of litigation activities that
can be penalized under the Sherman Act. There is no reason to believe,
however, that these principles are limited to antitrust cases. Indeed, Noerr-
Pennington has already been cited and its policies applied in other areas of
the law, as demonstrated by Bill Johnson's Restaurants.
The effect of Noerr-Pennington outside the antitrust arena has received
little attention. Although most commentators have discussed the First
Amendment basis for the immumty in general terms,26 they have not
explored the broader scope of the Noerr-Pennington line of decisions. The
one exception is a student note by Robert A. Zauzner, written prior to
McDonald v Smith. 2 Zauzmer argues that the Petition Clause does not
provide absolute mimunity from liability, particularly for defamation;263 the
Supreme Court adopted this view in McDonald v Smith and invoked the
actual malice rule applicable to defamation cases generally '- Zauzmer
posits that Noerr-Pennington's principles should not be applied outside the
antitrust field, and he criticizes several cases that found absolute petitiomng
privileges in tortious interference, civil rights, libel, and malicious
prosecution cases. 65
259 See id. at 911-15.
260. See id. at 913-14. Justice Stevens distinguished the defendants m Claiborne
Hardware from the railroad lobbyist defendants in Noerr- "Like the railroads in Noerr, the
petitioners certainly foresaw-and directly intended-that the merchants would sustain
economic injury as a result of their campaign. Unlike the railroads in that case, however,
the purpose of petitioners' campaign was not to destroy legitimate competition." Id. at 914.
261. See Bien, supra note 15, at 44-46; Fischel, supra note 203, at 84 n.32, 88 (noting
that later precedents indicate that Noerr resolved First Amendment issue); see also Balmer,
supra note 203, at 56-62; cf. Milton Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, 73 COLUM.
L. REv 415, 434-35 (1973) (arguing that Noerr did not reach constitutional issue);
Zauzmer, supra note 230, at 1250 & n.33 (same).
262. Zauzmer, supra note 230.
263. See id. at 1248-49.
264. See McDonald v Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
265. See Zauzmer, supra note 230, at 1256-59. Zauzmer cites a number of lower court
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If there were ever any doubt, it is now clear-in light of California
Motor Transport, Bill Johnson's Restaurants, McDonald v Smith, and
Professional Real Estate Investors-that the Petition Clause is not absolute.
Rather, there must be a balancing between the right to petition and
whatever countervailing interests are served by antitrust law or other bodies
of law that may impinge on access to the courts. The difficult question is
how that balance should be struck.
Because Noerr-Pennington has a constitutional pedigree, the Supreme
Court's recent announcement of a two-part test for sham litigation should
be analyzed to determine whether it has any applicability to other areas of
the law Presumably, the Court will find litigation behavior constitutionally
protected unless the party attacking the behavior can show that the behavior
is in some way illegitimate-that it constitutes sham litigation or is a fraud
on the court. In Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court established
a two-part test, requiring that the litigation behavior be both objectively
unreasonable and improperly (anticompetitively) motivated.' Leaving
aside cases of fraud on the court (such as Walker Process), this new two-
part test appears to be the stricture with which other areas of law must now
comport. Using a categorical constitutional analysis, the Professional Real
Estate Investors Court has provided guidelines under which Petition Clause
claims can be evaluated. If the two-part test is met (or if fraud on the court
is proven), then the litigation behavior can be penalized; if the test is not
met, then the behavior is constitutionally protected. Given that this balance
is suitable for antitrust cases, it should be the presumptive framework for
evaluating other laws that constrain litigation behavior.
cases applying Noerr-Pennington broadly, including Weiss v Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467
F Supp. 803, 817-18 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (involving civil rights claim); Sierra Club v Butz,
349 F Supp. 934, 937-39 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that claim of tortious interference with
business advantage is barred by absolute privilege); City of Long Beach v Bozek, 645 P.2d
137, 143 (Cal. 1982) (finding absolute privilege against malicious prosecution claim),
vacated, 459 U.S. 1095, reinstated, 661 P.2d 1072 (Cal. 1983); Webb v Fury, 282 S.E.2d
28, 36-37 (W Va. 1981) (finding absolute privilege in libel case).
Contrary to Zauzmer's position, the Supreme Court clearly views Noerr as a general
Petition Clause case. Bill Johnson's Restaurants establishes this point. See Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744 (1983) ("[Petition clause] [c]onsiderations
led us in the antitrust context to adopt the 'mere sham' exception in California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). We should follow a similar
course under the NLRA.'); cf. Zauzmer, supra note 230, at 1261 (presenting contrary
interpretation of Bill Johnson's Restaurants).
266. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
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C. Applying Professional Real Estate Investors Beyond Antitrust Law
1. Introduction
Even a brief review of the legal landscape reveals many fields in which
common-law decisions, rules, and statutes apply a subjectively based
standard for evaluating litigation behavior. This Article will examine three
areas of law to illustrate the point: the common-law tort of abuse of
process, Rule I1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the federal
attorney bad faith statute (28 U.S.C. § 1927). Each of these laws
condemns litigation brought for an improper or bad faith purpose, often
regardless of whether the litigation is objectively without merit. Many
other provisions of state and federal law share this focus on subjective
intent. For example, Rules 16(t) and 26(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permit the imposition of sanctions for bad faith discovery
abuses. 67 Bankruptcy Rule 9011 penalizes bad faith actions in bankruptcy
proceedings." The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure include broad
disciplinary powers."
267 FED. R. Civ P 16(0, 26(g). Rule 16(f) states m relevant part: "UIlf a party or
party's attorney fails to participate [in a pretrial conference] in good faith, the judge, upon
motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just
FED. R. Civ P 16(f) (emphasis added). Rule 26(g) states m relevant part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable
inquiry, the request, response, or objection is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation
FED. R. Civ P 26(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added). This language is particularly similar to the
subjective good faith prong of Rule 11. Cf. FED. R. Civ P 37(b)(2) (imposing discovery
sanctions when party's actions are not "substantially justified").
268. BANKR. R. 9011. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 states in relevant part:
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that to the
best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry [the petition, pleading, motion, and other paper] is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation or administration of the case.
BANKR. R. 9011(a) (emphasis added).
269. See FED. R. APP P 46(c). Rule 46(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure states:
A court of appeals may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show
cause to the contrary, and after hearing, if requested, take any appropriate
disciplinary action against any attorney who practices before it for conduct
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In addition to state law counterparts to these federal rules, some states
have statutory or common-law doctrines that permit the award of litigation
expenses when a party acts in bad faith. For example, Georgia law
provides:
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as part of the
damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made
prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in badfaith, has been
stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and
expenses, the jury may allow them.'70
Finally, many provisions of federal and state law impose automatic (or
nearly automatic) fee-shifting for prevailing parties."7 In theory, these
statutes are subject to challenge on the ground that they may "chill"
advocacy Indeed, they can be viewed as a form of strict liability because
the prevailing party recovers attorneys' fees and other litigation costs
regardless of the merit of the losing party's position. In Gertz v Robert
unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with these rules or
any rule of the court.
FED. R. APP. P 46(c) (emphasis added); cf. FED. R. APP. P 38 (permitting sanctions only
for frivolous appeals). United States Supreme Court Rule 42.2 permits the recovery of
damages and single or double costs only if "a writ of certiorari, an appeal, or application
for other relief is frivolous." SUP. CT. R. 42.2.
270. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-6-11 (1981) (emphasis added). The plaintiff need only
establish one of these three prongs to seek litigation expenses. See National Serv Indus.
v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 661 F.2d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally
ADP-Financial Computer Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 703 F.2d 1261 (11th Cir. 1983); Jones
v Spmdel, 235 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. 1977). Although this provision only applies to plaintiffs
and partly deals with conduct outside the litigation itself, some applications of the statute
would raise Petition Clause concerns.
Another common-law claim is tortious interference with business relations. See
Badger Cab Co. v Soule, 492 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing claim
and citing other cases).
271. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct 1023, 1033 & n.19 (1994) (holding
that prevailing parties need not prove either bad faith or frivolousness to recover attorneys'
fees under § 505 of Copyright Act of 1976). Many attorneys' fees statutes involve
variations on the "English rule" of automatic awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties.
See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988) (providing that under Equal Access to Justice Act, plaintiff can
recover attorneys' fees unless opponent's position is substantially justified); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1988) (awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs, but allowing prevailing
defendants to recover only if claim is unreasonable or frivolous); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1988) (Freedom of Information Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act).
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Welch, Inc.,' a defamation case, the Court held that the First Amendment
prohibits the imposition of strict liability, at least upon speech regarding
matters of public concern.273 Nonetheless, there are other considerations
in these cases, such as the compelling or strong interests furthered by the
particular statutory scheme. Further, because these fee-shifting statutes
reward prevailing parties, their effect on the incentive to litigate is
ambiguous. 4  Finally, some fee-shifting statutes only permit prevailing
plaintiffs to recover their fees, 5 wich also complicates the analysis. A
complete analysis of tis topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
2. The Tort of Abuse of Process
Under the common law, two tort actions are available for the misuse
of the adjudicatory process: abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
These torts differ m terms of their elements and available defenses. The
tort of malicious prosection generally requires proof of four elements:
(1) the institution of civil or criminal proceedings against the plaintiff,
(2) the termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff, (3) the
absence of probable cause to institute the proceedings, and (4) the presence
of "malice" or bad faith.276
Abuse of process, on the other hand, does not require proof that the
legal process was invoked without probable cause. The two elements of
this tort are the presence of an ulterior purpose and an overt act that is not
proper m the ordinary course of a proceeding.'m As Prosser and Keeton
note, this tort "provide[s] a remedy for a group of cases in which legal
procedure has been set m motion in proper form, with probable cause, and
even with ultimate success, but nevertheless has been perverted to
accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed." 278
272. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz rule applies to private figure plaintiffs, who are
not required to prove actual malice. See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343
(1974).
273. See ut. at 347-48 & n.10.
274. For citations to commentary on the effect of fee-shifting statutes, see Richard L.
Schmalbeck & Gary Myers, A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 1986 DUKE L.J. 970, 974-79 & n.18.
275. See supra note 271.
276. See PROSSER & KE TON, supra note 165, § 119, at 871. Some jurisdictions
require a showing of special damages as an element of a malicious prosecution claim
involving civil (but not criminal) proceedings. See d. § 120, at 889.
277 See itd. § 121, at 898.
278. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
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The essence of abuse of process is the actor's unlawful purpose in
utilizing the machinery of the courts: "The purpose for which the process
is used, once it is issued, is the only thing of importance.""9 In the classic
English case, Grainger v Hill,'& the defendant had the plaintiff arrested for
a collateral purpose." The arrest was intended to coerce the plaintiff, a
ship's captain and owner, to surrender the register of his vessel. ' The
defendant argued that the plaintiff could show neither that the proceeding
had terminated in his favor nor that it was baseless.' In response, the
court held:
[T]his is an action for abusing the process of law, by applying it to
extort property from the Plaintiff, and not an action for a malicious
arrest or malicious prosecution, in order to support which action the
termination of the previous proceeding must be proved, and the absence
of reasonable and probable cause be alleged as well as proved.2
Modem American cases follow the same principle by recogmzing the
absence of a requirement that the underlying proceeding lack probable
cause.us Indeed, there is even some precedent for the view that an abuse
of process claim cannot be brought if the underlying action was frivolous.'
279. Id.
280. 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P 1838).
281. See Grainger v Hill, 132 Eng. Rep. 769, 772 (C.P 1838).
282. See id.
283. See id. at 773.
284. Id.
285. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, § 121, at 897 & nn.4-5 (citing cases);
see also Warwick Dev. Co. v. GV Corp., 469 So. 2d 1270, 1274-75 (Ala. 1985) (involving
use of unlawful detainer claim as retribution against lessee); Board of Educ. v Farmingdale
Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 343 N.E.2d 278, 283 (N.Y 1975) (involving misuse of
subpoena process during labor dispute); Ginsberg v Ginsberg, 443 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441
(App. Div 1981) (involving use of subpoena to harass wife and to exhaust her financial
resources); Badger Cab Co. v. Soule, 492 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that bad faith or lack of probable cause may establish abuse of process).
286. See WILLIAM L. PRosSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1022 (8th ed.
1988) (citing Wells v Orthwein, 670 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), and Martin v
Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (rex. Civ App. 1978)). A better view would permit both an
abuse of process and a malicious prosecution claim to exist if a frivolous suit is brought for
an improper purpose. As long as the plaintiff is not permitted a double recovery, there
should be no bar to the assertion of both legal theories. See Badger Cab Co., 492 N.W.2d
at 381 (holding that abuse of process claim may be based on bad faith or lack of probable
cause); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, § 121, at 898 & nn. 11-12 (noting that theories
overlap and that both may be asserted in same action).
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The tort of abuse of process as it is commonly interpreted does not
withstand the scrutiny of Professional Real Estate Investors. Liability can
hnge on a showing of subjective purpose, a result that the Petition Clause
precludes. The tort's impact on petitioning rights can be severe because
traditional tort remedies are potentially available, including damages for
emotional distress and financial losses and possibly punitive damages.'-1
There is no reason to assume, moreover, that abuse of process serves some
governmental interest that is more compelling than those served by the
Sherman Act."s
3. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In its present form, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires attorneys or unrepresented parties to certify that "to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances, [the pleading, motion, or other paper]
is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." 9
Although this discussion is limited to the federal Rule 11, many states have
counterpart provisions identical or similar to the federal provision. 29°
287 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 165, § 121, at 899-900. Courts have recently
applied Professional Real Estate Investors to common-law claims of malicious prosecution,
tortious interference, breach of fiduciary duty, and abuse of process. See Whelan v Abell,
827 F Supp. 801, 801-04 (D.D.C. 1993) (Sporkin, J.), dismissed, 1993 WL 410900 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 6, 1993); see also Matossian v Fahmie, 161 Cal. Rptr. 532, 535-38 (Ct. App.
1993) (applying Petition Clause to common-law claims); cf. Zauzmer, supra note 230, at
1256-59 (discussing cases applying Noerr outside antitrust context).
288. In Northern Pacific RailWay v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court stated:
"The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." Id. at 4. Similarly, in
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), the Court stated: "The
purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce,
to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest, to afford protection from the
subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor." Id. at 359.
289. FED. R. Civ P 11(b)(1) (emphasis added). The attorney or unrepresented party
must also satisfy three other prongs of the rule (as amended in 1993), which focus on a
reasonable basis in law, a reasonable basis in fact for all allegations, and a reasonable basis
in fact for all denials of factual contentions. See FED. R. Civ P 11(b)(2)-(4).
290. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCrIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
§ 1, at 2 (2d ed. 1994). Because Rule 11 was amended in 1993, many state counterparts
track the older language of the rule, which contained a subjective prong similar to that in
the present rule. See Fed. R. Civ P 11 (1988). In addition, several other federal rules
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Case authorities and commentators are divided as to whether a Rule 1 1
violation can ever be established when the claim or motion has a factual and
legal basis."g  This disagreement has, until now, been a matter of
interpreting Rule lI's language and policy The better view, particularly
given the language of Rule 11, is that sanctions can be assessed solely on
the basis of a finding of bad faith.
Thus, there are several independent ways in which an attorney or party
can violate Rule 11. An illustrative Eleventh Circuit case, Didie v
Howes,2' states that Rule 11 is violated if any of three types of conduct can
be proven: the filing of a pleading (1) that has no reasonable basis in fact,
(2) that is not based on existing law or a reasonable argument for changing
current law, or (3) that is brought in bad faith or for an improper
purpose.2" Didie and numerous other Rule 11 cases illustrate that the Rule
includes both an objective prong (a reasonable basis in law and fact) and a
separate subjective prong.2' In most circuits, Rule 11 sanctions can be
levied based solely on a violation of the subjective bad faith portion of the
Rule; in other words, an attorney or party can be sanctioned for meritorious
but improperly motivated litigation activities.2' Thus, courts have fre-
include a similar subjective prong. See supra notes 267-69.
291. See infra note 295.
292. 988 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1993).
293. See Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993).
294. See id., see also Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. disnussed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
Rule 11 in its original form contained only a subjective prong; the objective prong
was added as part of the 1983 amendments to the Rule. See JOSEPH, supra note 290, § 13,
at 216 ("The improper purpose clause is a vestige of the original Rule 11, which generally
required [a] finding of subjective bad faith before sanctions could be imposed. Although
a finding of bad faith is no longer prerequisite to the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction, it
will support a sanction under the improper purpose clause of the Rule." (citing In re
Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1186 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987))). Many
post-1983 Rule 11 cases state that the governing standard is now an objective one. These
statements, however, relate to the objective prongs of the rule. Parties threatened with
sanctions under these objective prongs often seek to defend their actions as motivated by
subjective good faith, an argument that the Supreme Court has rejected. See Business
Guides, Inc. v Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 549 (1991) (applying
objective prong of Rule 11).
295. See, e.g., Pathe Computer Control Sys. Corp. v Kinmont Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d
94, 96-97 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that motion to transfer case at eleventh hour was brought
for purposes of delay and warranted Rule 11 sanctions); Bryant v Brooklyn Barbeque
Corp., 932 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1991) (involving complaint filed to generate bad
publicity), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1992); Pelletier v Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1513-
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quently sanctioned nonfrivolous litigation that was brought to harass, to
cause unnecessary delay, or to increase litigation costs.'9
22 (1 Ith Cir.) (involving baseless suit brought for purposes of harassment), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 167 (1991); Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir.) (involving harassment
through abusive language in pleadings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821 (1990); see also Pierce
v F.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820, 831 (2d Cir. 1992); Brown v Federation of State
Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1436 (7th Cir. 1987); Robinson v National Cash Register
Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1130 (5th Cir. 1987); Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 788 F.2d
247, 248 (4th Cir. 1986). But see Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1508
(9th Cir. 1987) (expressing minority view that improper purpose is insufficient basis for
Rule I I violation).
For commentary on this issue, see JOSEPH, supra note 290, § 13(C). Gregory Joseph
states:
There is a slight split among the Circuits as to whether sanctions may be
imposed for the filing of a meritorious paper for an improper purpose. The
prevailing, and better, view is that sanctions may be imposed in these
circumstances, and it may be summarized as follows: Presenting a pleading,
written motion or other paper for an improper purpose violates the Rule, even
if the paper has ample evidentiary support and is warranted in law
Id. at 221; see also GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RuLE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES
AND PREVENrIVE MEASURES § 4.01[b][1][G] (2d ed. Supp. 1993) (discussing conflicting
authorities and citing cases awarding sanctions for well-grounded actions brought in bad
faith). Georgene Vairo supports a position opposite that of Joseph. See id.
§ 4.01[b][1][G][ii], at 4-44 ("If there are legal and factual grounds for pursuing a claim,
courts should stay out of the intrusive and time-consuming business of second-guessing a
litigant's motives for pursing the claim or motion."). See generally George C. Cochran,
Trouble on the Horizon: The Caseload Problem and the "Frivolous Appeal, " 2 FIFrH
CiRCUrr REP 249 (1985).
296. See Pathe Computer Control Sys. Corp. v Kinmont Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 94,
96-97 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that motion to transfer case at eleventh hour was brought for
purposes of delay and warranted Rule 11 sanctions); Bryant v Brooklyn Barbeque Corp.,
932 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1991) (involving complaint filed to generate bad publicity),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1992); Pelletier v Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1520 (11th Cir.)
(involving RICO action brought for purposes of harassing defendant and obtaining quick
settlement), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 167 (1991); Coats v Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th
Cir.) (involving harassment through abusive language in pleadings), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
821 (1990); Harrison v Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 142, 143-45
(M.D.N.C. 1993) (finding that last-minute motion to disqualify counsel was brought to
harass, delay, and needlessly increase cost of litigation); Novak v National Broadcasting
Co., 779 F Supp. 1428, 1428 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that although litigation had some
merit, pleading with repeated references to opposing counsel as "Laurel and Hardy" was
subject to sanctions as intended to harass); Lelsz v Kavanagh, 137 F.R.D. 646, 648-55
(N.D. Tex. 1991) (involving last-minute, bad faith motions); Ballentine v Taco Bell Corp.,
135 F.R.D. 117, 121-23 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (finding that Rule 11 sanctions was appropriate
m case in which plaintiff brought suit for dual purposes of obtaining relief and harassing his
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The subjective prong of Rule 11 is thus analogous to the common-law
tort of abuse of process, just as the Rule's objective prong is similar to a
malicious prosecution claim.2' Although courts are careful to impose
sanctions only in unusual circumstances and generally require objective
evidence that the motion or pleading was brought for improper purposes, 298
it is still quite possible for an attorney or party to be sanctioned despite
having a well-grounded pleading or motion. In this respect, Rule 1 1-like
the tort of abuse of process-is inconsistent with the command in Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors that litigation activity must first be objectively
unreasonable before it can be sanctioned.2' Accordingly, Rule l1's
subjective prong potentially violates the First Amendment Petition Clause,
as it has been interpreted in Professional Real Estate Investors.
As in the case of abuse of process, there does not appear to be any
way to distinguish Rule 11 from the antitrust laws. Rule 1l's potential
infringement of petitioning rights is as serious as the effect of an antitrust
suit. In fact, the impact of Rule 11 on the right to petition is arguably
more severe, given the number and gravity of Rule 11 motions."
Furthermore, the governmental interests served by Rule 11-although
strong-are of no greater weight than those interests furthered by federal
antitrust law Rule 11 serves several laudable purposes, as the Supreme
Court stated in Cooter & Gell v Hartmarx Corp.:31 "It is now clear that
the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in the district
courts and thus streamline the administration and procedure of the
federal courts." 3"
former manager); Katz v Looney, 733 F Supp. 1284, 1287-88 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(involving complaint that alleged that law school dean "is totally inept, totally incompetent,
and is not even familiar with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even though he is
supposedly licensed to practice law and is supposedly the Dean of the law school").
297 See Szabo Food Serv., 823 F.2d at 1083.
298. See JOSEPH, supra note 290, § 13(C), at 222 (discussing cases).
299. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
300. As of 1994, there are over 7,000 reported decisions regarding Rule 11, and no
doubt many other instances are unreported. JOSEPH, supra note 290, at xxiii. For
discussion of the types of sanctions available, see id. § 16.
301. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
302. Cooter & Gell v Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990); see also Business
Guides, Inc. v Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 542 (1991) ("Rule 11
is aimed at curbing abuses of the judicial system." (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at
397)); cf. FED. R. Civ. P 11 advisory committee notes (1993 amendments) ("[Tihe purpose
of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate ").
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There is no reason to assume that these legitimate state interests are
stronger than the procompetitive and proconsumer goals of the Sherman
Act. The imposition of liability for harassing, delaying, or cost-increasing
behavior under Rule 11 is laudable, but so is liability for misusing
litigation to achieve anticompetitive ends. In fact, the very same behavior
that forms the basis for an antitrust violation could also run afoul of Rule
11-such as the filing of a motion or pleading used to impose litigation
costs on a marketplace rival. Nor is there any reason to believe that Rule
11 interests are more directly served than are antitrust interests.
As a result of Professional Real Estate Investors, the debate regarding
the subjective prong of Rule 11 assumes a constitutional dimension. One
way to resolve this First Amendment concern is to interpret Rule 11
narrowly by permitting sanctions for bad faith behavior only if there is
also evidence of unreasonable litigation tactics. In essence, this approach
would adopt the two-part test of Professional Real Estate Investors,
requiring a finding of unreasonableness as well as bad faith.0 3 This
approach would also pay homage to the view, expressed in Noerr, that
statutes (such as the Sherman Act) and thus also rules (such as Rule 11)
should be interpreted in their constitutional context and that any conflict
with constitutional provisions should be avoided if possible °.31 By using
this familiar canon of statutory interpretation,05 the Petition Clause
challenge to Rule 11 would be averted completely
The difficulty with this course is that it is inconsistent with existing
Rule 11 precgdent in many circuits and, more fundamentally, with the
language of the Rule itself. Rule 11 seems to contemplate the imposition
of sanctions for bad faith behavior, regardless of the substantive merit of
the claim or motion. Thus, every such sanction is now subject to
constitutional challenge in light of Professional Real Estate Investors.
4. The Federal Attorney Bad Faith Statute
Enacted in 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides a statutory remedy for
bad faith actions by attorneys. The statute provides as follows:
303. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
304. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 136-38 (1961).
305. For general commentary on this rule of statutory interpretation, see 2A NORMAN
J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.11, at 4849 & nn.4 & 14-17
(5th ed. 1992) (discussing rule and citing cases).
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Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases m any court
of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required
by the court to satisfy personally the excess cost, expenses, and
attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.'
A violation of § 1927 can be based on a finding of improper purpose.
In McMahon v Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc.," for example, the court
focused on whether a litigant's resort to state court was m bad faith for
purposes of § 1927, as opposed to whether it was objectively reasonable
under, for example, Rule lI's objective prong."'
A violation of § 1927 requires more than a showing of a frivolous or
inprovidently brought suit. 9 Indeed, the promulgation of Rule 11 was m
part a response to restrictive judicial interpretations of the scope of
§ 1927 31 Some courts have held that a violation of § 1927 cannot be
established unless the pleading or motion lacks a plausible factual or legal
basis.311 This interpretation of § 1927 would comport with Professional
Real Estate Investors's requirement of objective unreasonableness as a
condition precedent to liability for litigation behavior.1 2
Other cases interpreting § 1927, however, focus on its requirement of
subjective bad faith or recklessness. For example, in United States v
Associated Convalescent Enterprises, Inc., an attorney was named on the
opposing party's witness list.314 The attorney filed a last-minute motion to
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988). For commentary on this statute, see generally Dan B.
Dobbs, Awarding Attorneys Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DuKE
L.J. 435; Janet E. Josselyn, Note, Song of the Sirens-Sanctionmg Lawyers Under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1927, 31 B.C. L. REv 477 (1990). The purpose of the statute is to deter
intentional and unnecessary delaying tactics. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing
& Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
307 896 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990).
308. See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 23-24 (2d Cir.
1990). The McMahon court ultimately found that the litigant had not acted in bad faith, but
noted that the opposing party may have "unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied these
proceedings." Id. at 24.
309. See generally Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 850 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir.
1988).
310. See VAIRO, supra note 295, § 1.02, at 1-7
311. See Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing
other decisions).
312. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
313. 766 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985).
314. United States v. Associated Convalescent Enters., Inc., 766 F.2d 1342, 1344 (9th
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prohibit the opposing party from calling him as a witness or, in the
alternative, to continue the trial and to disqualify him as counsel. 3 5 The
court granted the continuance and disqualified the attorney, but then
sanctioned the attorney under § 1927 for delaying the proceedings.3 16 The
Ninth Circuit, noting that recklessness or bad faith is the keystone for
§ 1927 liability, upheld the sanction and concluded that the attorney had
acted in a "calculated" manner.11 Significantly for the purposes of
Professional Real Estate Investors, there was no discussion of the objective
merit of the attorney's last-minute motion; in fact, the district court
granted the attorney's motion in part.38 The focus under § 1927, as in
abuse of process and Rule 11 cases, is on the use of a legitimate litigation
strategy for an improper purpose.
Accordingly, whether § 1927 law is affected by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Professional Real Estate Investors depends upon whether the
statute includes a requirement of unreasonable conduct. The language of
§ 1927 refers to conduct that multiplies the proceeding "unreasonably and
vexatiously ,"319 If courts hew to the wording of the statute, then it should
survive a First Amendment Petition Clause challenge. Certainly, the right
to petition argument should be used as a guide to interpreting the statute,
as has been the tradition in the Sherman Act area.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Professional Real Estate Investors




317 See id. at 1346-47; cf. United States v Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.
1983) (applying bad faith or recklessness standard).
318. See Associated Convalescent, 766 F.2d at 1344.
319. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988). Another statute that may require narrow interpretation
is 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1988). This provision, which has received little scholarly review,
states as follows: "Where a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of
appeals, the court m its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his
delay, and single or double costs." Id. (emphasis added). See generally Laura B. Bartell,
Taxation of Costs and Awards of Expenses in Federal Court, 101 F.R.D. 553 (1984). For
an example of a broad reading of this statute, see Sturgeon v Airborne Freight Corp., 778
F.2d 1154, 1161 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that award of sanctions under § 1912 requires
showing of unreasonableness or lack of reasonable good faith belief m appeal and citing
other cases).
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and federal laws regulating the conduct of litigation. It is now clear that
Noerr-Pennington immunity for petitioning activity is a constitutionally
based doctrine. The First Amendment Petition Clause protects litigation
behavior from antitrust scrutiny unless the antitrust plaintiff can prove both
elements of a two-part test: "Mhe lawsuit must be objectively baseless in
the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on
the merits," and the lawsuit must be brought for anticompetitive
purposes.32°
The effect of this decision for antitrust law purposes is troubling.
Particularly if it is interpreted to require a showing of baseless or frivolous
litigation, Professional Real Estate Investors will permit some predatory
litigation strategies to avoid antitrust scrutiny Claims with some tenuous
factual and legal plausibility that would not have been brought-but for
their predatory effect-will now be immunized.
More significantly, Professional Real Estate Investors will require
reevaluation of an array of state and federal law governing litigation
behavior. The decision's condemnation of standards based solely on
"improper purpose" has a constitutional dimension. The decision may
thus bar claims under the common law, such as the tort of abuse of
process. It can affect a panoply of federal statutes and rules that govern
litigation practices, such as Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 And it can
alter the counterpart rules and statutes adopted in many states.
Professional Real Estate Investors discourages the imposition of
penalties for litigation behavior unless the litigation first fails to satisfy
objective indicia of unreasonableness. Many federal and state law
remedies for litigation abuse focus, however, on subjective bad faith as the
sole benchmark for sanctions. Unless Professional Real Estate Investors
can be distinguished in some way, these areas of law must justify their
departure from the new rule in the antitrust area. The common-law,
statutory, and rule-based sanctions for litigation behavior have at least as
much impact on petitioning activity as the imposition of antitrust liability
Indeed, the lack of Noerr-Pennington immunity does not establish a
substantive antitrust violation; the plaintiff must still prove the elements
of a particular antitrust violation-such as monopolization-and prove
damages causally linked to the violation.32' Under the tort of abuse of
process, Rule 11, § 1927, and various other litigation sanctions, the
320. Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1928.
321. See id.
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improperly motivated litigation activity can itself establish liability and
leave only the issue of damages for resolution. Rule 11 in particular is a
commonly used and often devastating attack on the right to litigate
grievances.
Given that the potential infringement on petitioning rights is at least
as great in these other areas of law, the next inquiry should be whether
these areas of law protect interests that are stronger than those advanced
by the Sherman Act. Again, there appears to be no principled basis on
which to argue that the tort of abuse of process, Rule 11, or § 1927
furthers such an interest. The interests that these laws promote, such as
deterring litigation abuse, are at best comparable to the interests furthered
by the Sherman Act.
In short, once Professional Real Estate Investors is accorded its
deserved status as a constitutional law decision, its impact on a wide array
of other laws regulating litigation is indisputable. This result leaves two
courses of action. Either each of these areas of law should be reassessed
in order to accord with the requirement of objective unreasonableness in
Professional Real Estate Investors, or the merit of this requirement should
be reevaluated.
There is some argument for the broad application of Professional Real
Estate Investors to other areas of law Perhaps the imposition of sanctions
or tort liability for well-grounded litigation should be stopped. It may
tend to chill legitimate petitioning because parties with well-grounded
claims may be liable for sanctions if they act for improper purposes, such
as to harass or delay Disputes regarding these subjective purposes may
also increase the amount of satellite litigation and thereby burden the
courts with litigation about litigation. On the other hand, the potentially
far-reaching effects of Professional Real Estate Investors may be a reason
to challenge its underlying assumption that litigation over "purpose" is
necessarily undesirable. The decision may permit parties to use the
adjudicatory process to achieve anticompetitive, abusive, or other
improper goals. Given its broadest reach, it can also undercut a wide
panoply of statutory and common-law remedies for misuse of litigation.
Courts or legislatures can modify some litigation rules to comport
with the Petition Clause. For example, § 1927 could easily be interpreted
to include a showing of unreasonable as well as ill-motivated conduct.
The tort of abuse of process can be modified by common-law courts to
include unreasonable conduct as an additional requisite to liability
Finally, in the case of Rule 11, the federal courts could interpret the
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subjective prong of the Rule to include a showing of unreasonable
conduct, although tlus interpretation strains the plain meaning of the Rule.
A full resolution of flus issue is beyond the scope of tus Article, but it is
clear that courts will need to address the problem in the wake of
Professional Real Estate Investors.
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